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1  Bank Industry Trends 
The U.S. banking system is undergoing dramatic consolidation. Ameri- 
ca’s historical predilection for requiring the chartering of local banks and 
limiting the powers of commercial banks has given way  to a new era of 
deregulation: nationwide banks with broad powers have taken over the 
industry after building themselves up largely through acquisitions. Is the 
current merger wave  in American banking helping to promote efficiency 
by  increasing the size and scope of banks, or is the bank merger wave 
driven by  darker aspirations: the search for monopoly rents or the job 
security and personal perquisites of bank managers? 
Researchers and industry analysts have approached this question in var- 
ious ways: (1) cross-regime comparisons of historical bank performance, 
(2) identification of the influences that encourage bank concentration, and 
(3) econometric studies of  the consequences of  consolidation. Interest- 
ingly, these various perspectives on bank consolidation have not agreed in 
their assessment of the potential or actual efficiency gains from mergers 
and acquisitions. Econometric studies have tended not to identify large 
potential efficiency gains, on average, from bank mergers. Those results 
have sometimes been interpreted as evidence that bank mergers typically 
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are attempts to reap monopoly rents or attempts by managers to improve 
their positions at the expense of  stockholders. In contrast, cross-regime 
comparisons of the performance of banking systems and analyses of the 
forces underlying bank mergers suggest large potential and actual gains 
over the past five years. We argue that detailed case studies of some recent 
merger transactions-provided  in section 2-help  to resolve some of these 
apparent inconsistencies and are particularly useful in an industry such as 
banking, in which rapid changes make even the recent past a poor guide 
to the future. 
Cross-Regime Comparisons 
Historical cross-country and cross-state comparisons suggest large po- 
tential  gains from current  bank  consolidation.  Studies comparing  the 
banking system of the United States (where regulation has been hostile 
to bank branching and consolidation) with the banking systems of coun- 
tries whose regulatory regimes allowed bank consolidation (especially Ger- 
many  and  Canada)  have  found  significant  deficiencies in  U.S. banks. 
Those deficiencies included limits on bank diversification, operating effi- 
ciency, the capacity to lend or take deposits per unit of capital, and the 
banking system’s ability to finance large-scale industrialization during the 
Second Industrial Revolution of  1870-1914  (Calomiris 1993, 1995; Ca- 
lomiris and Ramirez 1996). These historical shortcomings of  American 
banking are traceable in large part to branching limitations and to other 
regulations that constrained American banks by keeping them small, un- 
diversified, and narrowly focused on lending and deposit taking. 
Furthermore,  U.S. states that were most liberal in their regulation of 
bank concentration (notably California, Ohio, and North Carolina) have 
historically  enjoyed  superior  banking  performance  (Calomiris  1993). 
Banks originating from those states (including Bank of America, Banc- 
One, NationsBank, and First Union) have become industry leaders not 
only in size but also in profitability, innovativeness, and growth. 
Consider differences in bank performance between the states of North 
Carolina (long a branching state) and Illinois (long a state that restricted 
bank branching). Illinois, by virtue of its commercial importance, might 
have produced nationwide leaders in banking, and yet  North Carolina’s 
banks have survived and prospered while Illinois’ most prominent banks 
have all but disappeared. Chicago, in particular, has seen its most impor- 
tant local banking institutions acquired by  international giants such as 
ABN Amro, Bank of America, Bank of Montreal, BancOne, and Citi- 
bank. With the exception of Northern Trust (and arguably First Chicago, 
which has merged with National Bank of Detroit), Chicago no longer has 
any major banking institution headquartered in Illinois. Table 1-1 repro- 
duces a performance comparison of the rates of return on bank assets and 
bank equity for Illinois and North Carolina from 1984 to 1992 (a period Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990s Efficient?  95 
Table 1-1  Bank Structure and Performance in Illinois and North Carolina, 
1984-1992 
Number of Banks  Return on Assets (%)  Return on Equity (%) 
North  North  North 
































































Source: Division of Research and Statistics, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, cited 
in McCoy, Frieder, and Hedges (1994). 
coincident  with  the  most  important  external  acquisitions  of  Chicago 
banks). North Carolina-based institutions not only enjoyed much higher 
average return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) but saw much 
smaller fluctuations than did Illinois banks. 
Superior historic performance in concentrated banking systems seems 
to reflect greater efficiency rather than higher rent extraction or inefficient 
managerial preferences for large size. Bank customers have shared in the 
efficiency gains from bank consolidation. Before World War I, narrowly 
focused unit banks in the United States offered an inferior menu of finan- 
cial services to industrial firms than their German counterparts did and 
charged higher costs for lending and underwriting (which reflected both 
technological inferiority of American banks and greater rent extraction in 
less competitive local unit banking markets) (Calomiris 1995). 
U.S. banks in rural areas were protected from competition by unit bank- 
ing laws. Large fixed costs of setting up a bank-as  opposed to a branch 
office-often  ensured a local monopoly. Rural unit banks charged higher 
rates of  interest on loans and paid less on deposits than urban banks. 
Branch banking regimes in other countries saw greater competition in ru- 
ral areas and did not witness regional differences in loan-deposit spreads 
(Calomiris 1993). U.S.  banks in unit banking states provided access to 
banking services inferior to that of rural offices in branch banking states, 
as measured by the number of bank offices per acre or per capita (Evanoff 
1988). Shaffer’s  (1993) study of Canadian banking giants measured the 
extent to which they enjoyed market power. He concluded that the highly 
concentrated  Canadian system (with six large banks) had been greatly 
competitive. 
These cross-regime comparisons are telling. Since the nineteenth cen- 96  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
Table 1-2  US. Bank Mergers and Acquisitions, 1979-1994 (billions of 1994 $) 
Assets of All  Assets of Banks 

















































Source: Data for consolidating banks are derived from Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell 
(1997), table 1A. 
Note: A family merger is defined as a merger between banks that are owned by the same 
parent institution. A merger is defined as the consolidation  of two banks within the same 
charter, while an acquisition is defined as the purchase of a bank that retained its charter. 
aThe sum of all nonfamily mergers and all acquisitions. 
tury, banking systems both within and outside the United States uniformly 
have taken the form of large-scale, multiproduct, branch banking systems 
when that option was not precluded by  restrictive regulations. There is 
strong evidence that regimes that are friendly to both consolidation and 
competition produce lower bank risk and higher bank productivity. Evi- 
dence from the current deregulation  of  U.S. banking, which we  discuss 
below, provides a similar perspective: both banks and their customers have 
gained from deregulation,  increased competition, and improvements in 
bank structure and services that have followed. 
Competition and the New Face of Banking 
One approach to evaluating the likely efficiency gains from the current 
merger wave (table 1-2) is to examine industry trends related to consolida- 
tion: to identify the origins of  the merger wave and ask whether it has 
coincided with efficiency gains for the banking industry as a whole. The 
argument that increased competition motivates the recent bank merger 
wave and that industry performance has improved with consolidation pro- 
vides some support for the view  that consolidation has promoted  effi- 
ciency. That is, if mergers result from competitive pressure, they are more 
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is less opportunity for rent extraction by banks and less tolerance for in- 
efficient managerial preferences for consolidation. 
Competition and Deregulation in Financial Services 
Increasing  competition has been an important trend in  the financial 
services industry over the past  twenty years. Initially, competition was 
spurred by a combination of financial innovation and deregulation in the 
market for deposits, both reflecting the effect of inflation on real rates of 
return to bank depositors. The removal of interest rate ceilings, the relax- 
ation of reserve requirements, the entry of money market mutual funds, 
and the growth in the commercial paper market, however, were just the 
beginning. Beginning in the early1980s, state laws and federal laws consis- 
tently favored increased entry into the previously protected  banking in- 
dustry. 
Foreign  bank  entry  was  facilitated  by  the  single-country  approach 
adopted by  the United States (codified in  1978), which treated the op- 
erating branches of foreign banks or chartered banks in the United States 
the same as domestic banks. The banking distress of the early 1980s was 
an important source of regulatory change allowing greater domestic bank 
entry, through holding company purchases of banks or bank branching. 
Weak and failing banks motivated regulators  to relax entry restrictions 
within and across states so that troubled banks could be acquired by banks 
within their state through branching or by out-of-state holding companies. 
Thirty-nine states relaxed their branching laws between 1979 and 1990 
(Mengle 1990). In some states, bank branching was the result of a 1988 
ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency requiring that banks be granted 
the same branching rights as thrifts. Regional pacts among states permit- 
ted interstate branching on a limited basis through most of the country by 
1990. Finally,  the  Riegle-Neal  Interstate  Banking and Branching  Effi- 
ciency Act of 1994 effectively repealed all limits on branching across states 
by January 1, 1997 (many states opted to comply with the act earlier). 
Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995, 166-67) traced the progress of inter- 
state bank entry, state by  state,  over the period  1979-1994  and docu- 
mented the sudden bursts of interstate entry that followed the removal 
of branching restrictions in each state. For the United States as a whole, 
the percentage of bank assets controlled by out-of-state banks rose from 
2 percent in  1979 to 10 percent in 1986 and then rocketed to 28 percent 
by  1994. The consolidation in  the banking industry over this period is 
remarkable. The total number of banking organizations fell from 12,463 
in 1979 to 7,926 in 1994, while the percentage of assets controlled by banks 
with over $100 billion in assets (in 1994 dollars) rose from 9.4 percent to 
18.8 percent (Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise 1995, 67). 
While deregulation  (especially the removal of branching restrictions) 
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United States, competition has been a key  exogenous factor as well. In- 
creased global competition among banks and competition from nonbank 
providers have spurred a reorganization of financial services worldwide. 
Technological changes that favor the repackaging of bank loans as securi- 
ties (securitization) and computerization changes that allow greater access 
to consumers have been  important in  spurring the new  global compe- 
tition. As late as 1980, America’s securities transactions with foreigners 
(gross sales and purchases of stocks and bonds) amounted to only 9 per- 
cent of the gross domestic product. By  1990, these transactions totaled 93 
percent of  GDP. International bank lending worldwide rose from $324 
billion in 1980 to $7.5 trillion in 1991 (Crook 1992). 
The importance of  global competition in the new  structure of  the fi- 
nancial services industry is reflected in the international aspect of  bank 
consolidation, affecting banks in many countries that have not shared the 
historic limitations on consolidation of  the United  States. Notable  ex- 
amples include Germany and Switzerland, where recent consolidations 
also reflect competitive pressure. Furthermore, the deregulation that has 
allowed bank restructuring in countries such as the United States itself 
largely reflects the effect of competitive pressure on regulators. In the new 
global environment, domestic bank regulators have been forced to choose 
between continuing heavy regulation of a shrinking system of banks or a 
healthy and deregulated domestic banking system. 
Although banking distress can be credited with the relaxation of state 
branching laws,  more fundamental long-run concerns shaped the policy 
of the Federal Reserve both on bank consolidation and on bank powers. 
The Fed’s support for expanding the scale and scope of banks explicitly 
reflected concerns that nonbank intermediaries and foreign banks were 
outcompeting American commercial banks and that relaxation of regula- 
tion was necessary to give U.S. banks a fighting chance to survive. Alan 
Greenspan (1988, 1990, 1992), Fed chairman, has repeatedly argued that 
increased scale and scope in banking is essential to maintaining an inter- 
nationally competitive U.S. banking sector. In a call for expanding bank 
powers, Greenspan (1988, 3-4)  argued: “The ability of banks to continue 
to hold their position by operating on the margins of customer services is 
limited. Existing constraints, in conjunction with the continued undermin- 
ing of the bank franchise by  the new  technology, are likely to limit the 
future profitability of banking. . . . If the aforementioned trends continue 
banking will  contract either relatively  or absolutely.” Similarly, the Fed 
chairman (1990, 5) argued, “in an environment of  global competition, 
rapid financial innovation, and technological change, bankers understand- 
ably feel that the old portfolio and affiliate rules and the constraints on 
permissible activities of  affiliates are no longer meaningful and likely  to 
result in a shrinking banking system.” 
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banks reflected the boom in foreign bank entry into the United States in 
the late 1980s. Foreign banks received a golden opportunity for entry into 
American banking markets during the capital crunch of 1985-1990.  Ca- 
lomiris and Carey (1 994) report that foreign banks’ share of nonmortgage 
commercial and industrial (C&I) lending in the United States rose from 7 
percent in 1983 to 14 percent in 1991, while the share of U.S. banks fell 
from 30 to 16 percent. 
Nonbank competition in C&I lending has also been important. Finance 
companies maintained a nearly constant share of 10-12  percent from 1983 
to  1993. But  the share of market  debt (bonds, commercial paper, and 
asset-backed securities) rose during the 1980s and early 1990s, from 40-41 
percent in 1983-1985  to 49-52  percent during 1991-1993.  Loans to small 
businesses-traditionally  reserved almost exclusively to banks-have  be- 
come a hotly contested market. Merrill Lynch, with offices throughout the 
United States, now boasts its status as the seventh largest lender to small 
businesses in the United States. In consumer banking, the credit card mar- 
ket has long been a highly competitive national market. But potential new 
providers of other retail consumer banking services now threaten to enter 
the national electronic market, and some of these (notably those with easy 
access to large customer bases, such as Microsoft) could threaten the tra- 
ditional consumer niches occupied by banks. 
Competition  should reduce monopoly  rents, enhance efficiency,  and 
weaken the power of inefficient bank managers to determine the goals and 
structure of their institutions. Empirical evidence is consistent with these 
predictions. Keeley (1990) and Berger and Humphrey (1992) found that 
local bank  monopolies were undermined in the  1980s by  relaxation of 
entry restrictions. Jayaratne and Strahan (1997) determined that the relax- 
ation of branching restrictions in the United States produced competitive 
pressures that cut bank  operating costs and loan losses and that these 
advantages were largely passed on to customers in the form of lower loan 
interest rates. Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey’s (1997) analysis of merg- 
ers uncovered no evidence of increased market power in deposit or lending 
markets as a result of consolidation during the 1980s. 
The link between consolidation and competition is also visible in the 
growth accompanying consolidation. The new competition has resulted in 
an increase in the number of bank offices even as it has promoted a decline 
in the number of banks. From 1980 to 1989, the number of banks declined 
by  12 percent, but the number of banking offices increased from 38,350 to 
51,300. By  1994, the number of bank offices had reached 65,610. Adding 
automated teller machines (ATMs) to the number of bank offices signifi- 
cantly adds to the measured growth in points  of  sale of  bank  services. 
ATMs increased in number from 13,800 in 1979 to 109,080 in 1994 (Ber- 
ger, Kashyap, and Scalise 1995, 79). 
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the decline in banks’ share of financial assets should not be viewed as a 
decline in the importance of banks but rather as evidence of technological 
advances that have allowed banks to do more things. Despite the rapid 
growth in nonbank financial institutions (notably pensions and mutuals), 
banks’ share of total financial institutions’ income is roughly the same as 
it was in the 1960s (about 40 percent), which largely reflects the growth in 
fee income. 
That the banking  industry  is not  shrinking deserves emphasis.  The 
movement to consolidation in banking is about competition and the en- 
hancement of efficiency, not about the elimination of excess capacity. Unit 
banking (with its high overhead costs of setting up points of service) had 
restricted efficient growth. With a break from the legacy of unit banking, 
the costs of entry and of establishing new banking locations fell dramati- 
cally, and the capacity of the industry increased. 
Retail banking and banking in less populated  areas are not the only 
markets that have seen increased competition. Entry into cities in states 
with historic limits on banking has been particularly pronounced. Chicago 
is the prime example (Calomiris and Karceski  1994). According to the 
New  York Times (February 21,  1995, C1, CS), competition in corporate 
lending has become so intense that some regulators  are concerned  that 
banks are no longer earning a sufficient return on large corporate lending 
within the United States. The Times reports: 
The average interest rate on a loan to a big company with a compara- 
tively  weak  BB  credit  rating  has fallen from  1.30 percentage  points 
above Libor [London Interbank Offered Rate] in  1992 to 0.79 point 
above Libor at the end of last year, according to statistics compiled by 
the Loan Pricing Corporation. .  . . Spreads for companies rated A fell 
from 0.40 to 0.25 point. And while statistics are not available, bankers 
say that rates for small businesses are declining at least that much. 
The new competition is not limited to traditional banking products and 
services. Encroachment by new entrants into the traditional activities of 
U.S. banks has been a spur to deregulation of bank activities (particularly 
through the efforts of the Fed) and has helped to promote competition in 
financial services previously not provided by banks. The more competition 
banks received, the more they were able to convince their regulators (Con- 
gress, the Fed, and the Comptroller) to allow them to enter new areas. 
U.S. commercial banks have become significant players in underwriting, 
derivatives intermediation, venture capital finance, and mutual fund man- 
agement and have begun to provide life insurance and annuities. Brewer 
(1989) found that bank holding companies that have taken advantage of 
the  new  permissible  activities  significantly have  improved  their  risk- 
adjusted returns as a consequence. This consolidation wave reflects not 
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also the desire on the part of banks to take advantage rapidly of the broad- 
ening of their new powers. 
The New Era of  Client-Bused Universal Bunking 
The era of  dividing the financial sector into fragmented niches, pro- 
tected by regulatory entry barriers, has ended. But if the financial services 
industry is  becoming more competitive, why  are banks so keen  to enter 
into new product lines? The answer is that commercial banking strategies 
are driven by  a belief in the value of  relationships, which translates into 
economics as quasi rents.  Bankers have come to believe that there are 
strong economies of scope in combining products within a single interme- 
diary. These economies of scope take the form not of physical production 
economies but rather of economies that arise in the context of relationship 
management. There are, for example, marketing and sales cost economies 
from cross-selling-a  lending relationship provides an opportunity to dis- 
cuss additional products with a client. There are also information and 
monitoring cost economies of  scope in relationships. A bank providing a 
loan or credit enhancement already tracks a firm’s performance and per- 
haps is enforcing a set of covenants or holding a collateral interest in the 
firm. Consequently, it is easier to evaluate and bear the counterparty risk 
of a swap with that customer or to evaluate the customer’s potential for a 
private or public equity offering. 
Because these client economies of scope provide a competitive advan- 
tage on any single transactional dimension to intermediaries that already 
provide other  transactional  or advisory services to clients and because 
such economies also imply costs of searching and switching on the part of 
clients, client economies of  scope offer banks  the  opportunity to reap 
quasi rents from their relationships. As Rajan (1992) points out, however, 
such an ex  post relationship advantage need not translate into ex  ante 
economic profit. The competition for new  relationships may  imply that 
much of these rents will be dissipated by front-loaded concessions to cus- 
tomers (so-called loss leaders). Indeed, underpricing loans as a means to 
attract customers into a relationship (sometimes referred to as tying) has 
become a common practice. Bankers are trained to judge profitability not 
on the basis of individual transactions but rather by  evaluating the total 
resources the bank devotes to a client (consisting predominantly of man- 
hours and funds) and the total fees and interest paid by the client. 
This approach to commercial banking accounted for the rebirth of Con- 
tinental Bank in the late 1980s and for the attractive acquisition offer it 
received from Bank of America in  1994. After its demise and rescue by 
the government in  1984, Continental shed its retail operations and out- 
sourced its noncore functions to focus on its core operations in corporate 
banking. The bank’s niche was defined not as a set of products per se but 
rather as a set of employees (and hence a base of knowledge about certain 102  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
customers) and as a type of client it wanted to have. Continental’s internal 
training program emphasized total client profitability, the sharing of infor- 
mation within and across client teams and deal teams within the bank, 
and the development of special internal accounting to allocate overhead 
costs and measure client profitability. Continental’s strategy was to use 
new products as a way to lock in a “share of mind”-to  move from simple 
to complex transactional  services and to provide financial and business 
advisory services so that clients would rely more on the bank. By acquiring 
Continental and moving its headquarters  of  corporate banking to Chi- 
cago, Bank of America expressed its confidence in that approach. 
The new emphasis on the economics of relationships, as opposed to 
productivity or profitability measured at the level of the product or service, 
is  not unique to Continental.  Chase’s motto,  “The right relationship is 
everything,” bespeaks the same approach. Harris Bank’s  “Vision 2002” 
is also based on a relationship-focused strategy, in determining both the 
combination of services and the location of its branches (Calomiris and 
Karceski 1994, 55-59;  1995, 14-26).  Similarly, Bancone’s profitability ac- 
counting smphasizes tracking overhead expenditure and evaluating the 
value  of  product  lines in  light of  general client relationships (McCoy, 
Frieder, and Hedges 1994). McCoy and his coauthors devote an entire 
chapter  of  their  book  to relationship banking  (“The New  Search for 
Growth: Relationship Banking”). In explaining the value of relationships, 
they explicitly point to the importance of quasi rents resulting from search 
and switch costs, though they use a different language (p. 18): “Capturing 
a greater share of  existing customers’ wallets through relationships has 
the potential of raising profitability significantly and locking in a bank’s 
customer base. That is, if  customers maintain  several products and sig- 
nificant balances with a given bank, they will be less likely to switch to a 
competitor.” 
Bankers clearly agree with this assessment and have been aggressive 
advocates of the deregulation of bank powers. Banks were successful in 
1996 and 1997 in pushing for substantial relaxation of firewalls that had 
separated the activities of underwriting (section 20)  affiliates and banks 
and in broadening the range of  permissable transactions in nonbank af- 
filiates. Recently, one of the most prominent bank industry representatives 
(the Bankers’ Roundtable) has advocated the rolling back of deposit insur- 
ance protection for banks to make it possible for Congress to grant even 
greater powers to bank holding companies (Bankers’ Roundtable 1997). 
New banking powers not only permit banks to provide new services to 
customers, they also give banks greater flexibility in meeting customers’ 
financing needs. During the 1980s and early 1990s, for example, some of 
the largest bank holding companies (including Citicorp, Chase, Chemical, 
First Chicago, Continental, Norwest, J.  P.  Morgan, and Bank of America) Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990s Efficient?  103 
earned a substantial fraction of their earnings from private equity invest- 
ments. 
It is hard to find bankers opposed to relationship-based strategy. The 
most prominent contrarian had been Bankers Trust, which had long es- 
poused a transactional vision of banking and had argued that profitable 
relationship banking had been undermined by competition. The view that 
competition had undermined the profitability of relationship banking- 
held by  some academics and journalists as well  as Bankers Trust execu- 
tives-failed  to distinguish between  the  old  (disappearing)  monopoly 
rents  of  noncompetitive banking  and  the new  quasi rents of  universal 
banking.  That confusion led Bankers Trust to discount the value of  a 
client-based strategy and to see its business as a sequence of independent 
transactions. In the wake of large losses in trading and derivatives deals in 
Latin America and the United States, Bankers Trust has changed manage- 
ment and strategy. In  1995-1997,  management focused on reducing the 
importance of trading activities and increasing the emphasis on relation- 
ship banking. 
That lesson holds for emerging market risk exposure of banks, as well 
as domestic strategy. The losses that Bankers Trust suffered in 1994 and 
1995 from its Latin American portfolio contrast with the experiences of 
Bank Santander, Bank of Boston, and Citibank in Latin America. Those 
banks have seen significant growth with far less exposure to country risk 
because they have established large branching networks, which they use 
to pursue profitable consumer and small business relationships in Mexico, 
Argentina, and elsewhere. 
The importance of customer lending relationships and the quasi rents 
they create for banks through the valuable information and control tech- 
nology banks enjoy (compared with arm’s-length debtholders) has been 
widely  documented in recent academic work. Over the past decade, an 
outpouring  of  empirical research  has  documented  the  special role  of 
banks as information collectors and enforcers of contracts under asym- 
metric information (James 1987; James and Wier 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap, 
and Scharfstein, 1990a, 1990b, 1991; Booth 1991; Slovin, Sushka, and Po- 
lonchek  1993; Best  and Zhang  1993; Petersen and Rajan  1994; Billett, 
Flannery, and Garfinkel 1995; Kashyap and Stein 1995; and Calomiris 
and Wilson 1997). 
Focusing on customer relationships also proves important in under- 
standing the way new entry occurs in lending markets and differences in 
the profitability of new and existing lenders. Calomiris and Carey (1994) 
argue that foreign bank entry into the U.S. corporate lending market dur- 
ing the 1980s reflected a cost of funds advantage on the part of foreign 
banks during the  U.S.  bank  capital crunch. But  foreign bank  entrants 
suffered an information cost disadvantage, which is visible in the form and 104  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
pricing of foreign bank entry. Foreign banks were able to underprice U.S. 
banks significantly only in the high-quality segment of  the market. For 
high-risk customers (where information costs are more important), foreign 
bank pricing was similar to that of domestic banks. Moreover, compared 
with domestic banks, foreign banks were much more likely to lend in the 
low-risk segment of  the market  and were  much more likely  to lend as 
passive members of syndicates or through the purchase of loans originated 
by domestic banks. The relationship cost advantage of domestic banks is 
also  visible  in  loan  performance  differences. Nolle  (1994)  found  that 
foreign-owned banks  in  the  United  States had  much  lower returns  on 
assets in the 1990s and that this difference reflected both higher overhead 
costs and higher loan-loss rates for foreign banks. 
Our case analyses provide evidence that this new approach to client- 
based universal banking is  central to understanding the merger wave  of 
the 1990s in US. banking and its potential efficiency gains. A bank’s mix- 
ture of products and services and its locational strategy are primarily set 
in reference to the client base that the bank is targeting rather than ac- 
cording to the technological costs or synergies associated with particular 
sets of products or services. Thus, mergers and acquisitions should be seen 
in the context of client-based universal banking strategies. 
Client-based strategies underlie many choices of acquisition targets in 
the nine case studies that we  discuss. In searching for merger targets, ac- 
quiring banks may be attempting to achieve operating cost economies of 
scale (a primary stated goal in the cases of  Firstar’s acquisition of  First 
Colonial, Roosevelt’s acquisition of Farm and Home, the merger of equals 
between Comerica and Manufacturers and, to a lesser extent, in the cases 
of  Firstar’s acquisition of  Investors, Mercentile’s acquisition of  United 
Postal, and First Chicago’s acquisition of Lake Shore). But often targets 
were at least as important because they provided missing links in a client- 
based strategy. They did so sometimes by providing a branching network 
to a targeted group of people whom the bank felt were its natural client 
base (as in the cases of Harris Bank’s acquisition of Suburban, First Chi- 
cago’s acquisition of Lake Shore, First Bank’s acquisition of Boulevard, 
and NationsBank’s acquisition of MNC). In other cases, targets provided 
a quick and inexpensive means of acquiring expertise in a set of services 
that fit the needs of the acquiring bank’s strategy (as in Mercantile’s take- 
over of United Postal, Firstar’s acquisition of Investors, and the Comerica- 
Manufacturers merger). 
Competition, Consolidation, and Eficiency Gains in the 1990s 
Given  the  deregulation of  entry and  the  new  client-based universal 
banking strategy made possible by the expansion of bank powers, compe- 
tition should encourage efficient consolidation. Thus, one would expect 
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be  associated with greater efficiency gains. Competition should promote 
efficient consolidation in two ways. 
First, competition magnifies the rewards for efficiency and the penalties 
for incompetence. If there are economies of scale, economies of scope (for 
example, due to the opportunities to cross-sell products within any given 
bank-customer relationship), or x-efficiencies associated with managerial 
skill, a competitive environment will encourage those potential efficiency 
gains to be realized by allowing efficient strategies to produce larger rela- 
tive earnings differences among competitors. 
Second, because competition  widens the distribution  of  earnings, it 
changes  the  incentives of  inefficient,  entrenched  bank  managers  and 
makes them more willing to step aside. In a noncompetitive environment, 
weak managers may  be insulated from stockholder discipline. If stock- 
holders rebel against managers only when earnings are low, then even in- 
efficient managers may do well enough in a noncompetitive environment 
to avoid discipline. In the face of increasing competition, poor managers 
who see their time running out will have an incentive to hasten their exit 
before the stockholders rebel and before all the franchise value of  their 
local monopoly is eroded by competing entrants. 
Thus,  an  emphasis  on  the  new  client-based approach  to banking, 
along with the acceleration in competition as the result of the repeal of 
branching restrictions during the early to mid-l990s, suggests that motiva- 
tions for mergers and the consequences of mergers during the 1990s could 
differ greatly from those of  the preceding years. In fact, there is  some 
evidence that the early 1990s have been a watershed not only for mergers 
but for bank efficiency. Despite the increased competition in lending mar- 
kets,  a  combination  of  cost savings and  the  introduction  of  new  fee- 
generating products and services seems to have produced a significant im- 
provement in bank industry performance. 
No available measure of performance for banks is ideal as a measure of 
long-run efficiency. Ideally, bank earnings must be adjusted for the riski- 
ness of bank activities, and some measures of short-term trends in bank 
performance can reflect exogenous cyclical influences on bank loan qual- 
ity or interest rates more than technological improvements. Furthermore, 
efficiency gains associated with increased competition may accrue to cus- 
tomers, not to banks, and may coincide with reductions in performance 
attributable  to reduced monopoly  rents. Thus,  bank  performance  im- 
provements during deregulation will understate productivity gains. 
Despite these caveats, it is hard not to be impressed by  the past five 
years’ improvement in bank performance, which bankers and bank ana- 
lysts interpret as a long-run improvement in productivity. Average market- 
to-book values for banks rose from an average of roughly unity for the 
period  1980-1991  to an average of  1.4 for the period  1992-1995  (James 
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ment. Perhaps the most popular measure of operating performance is the 
return on equity. As table 1-3 shows, commercial bank return on equity 
since 1992 has been high and stable compared even with the return in the 
early  1980s (before the deterioration in  bank loan quality that lowered 
ROE in the late 1980s). 
Higher  bank  profitability  today  is  not  driven  by  higher  loan  ratios 
(which are roughly constant over time). Part of the improvement in bank 
performance is due to a widening of net interest margin (net interest in- 
come relative to interest-earning assets). This has grown over time despite 
the reductions in lending spreads for corporate loans. As bankers empha- 
size, the key to the growth in net interest margin has been new retail lend- 
ing products (such as home equity loans) that have permitted banks to 
move into relatively high margin consumer lending. The other primary 
contributor to improved bank performance has been noninterest income. 
Relative to assets, noninterest income has doubled  over the past twelve 
years. While noninterest expenses (essentially salaries and wages) have 
risen relative to assets (because of the growth of off-balance  sheet activi- 
ties), the growth in noninterest expense has more than paid for itself in 
generating new sources of income and higher interest margins. That trade- 
off  is captured (albeit imperfectly) in a measure known in the banking 
industry as the efficiency ratio: the ratio of noninterest expense (not in- 
cluding chargeoffs) relative to net interest and noninterest income. In table 
1-3, we  report that measure, which shows virtual constancy during the 
period 1981-1991  but falls dramatically afterward. 
One of the clearest indicators of the effects of the new competition on 
bank performance is the changing composition of earnings and expenses 
for Midwestern banks.  These banks have seen a decline in net interest 
margin alongside growth in noninterest income and a decline in noninter- 
est expense. That region more than any other had been characterized by 
branching restrictions that limited competition in local lending markets 
and kept banks from realizing cost savings and relationship synergies. As 
shown in table 1-3, banks in the Midwest saw a decline in their net interest 
margin from 4.57 percent in 1993 to 2.89 percent in 1997, while noninter- 
est expenses fell from 4.18 percent of assets to 3.43 percent and nonin- 
terest income rose from 2.15 percent to 2.63 percent. The simultaneity of 
these changes provides evidence of improved productivity. Midwest banks 
found ways to improve their noninterest earnings per asset dollar while 
cutting their noninterest costs per asset dollar. Thus, despite declining in- 
terest margins, Midwest banks have maintained their ROE. 
Of course, the cost reductions  in American  banking are not entirely 
attributable to consolidation. Changes in technology (notably the replace- 
ment of teller-originated transactions with ATMs) would have produced 
cost savings even without any consolidation. Nevertheless, the improve- 
ment in bank efficiency reflects favorably on the case for bank mergers in Table 1-3  Commercial Bank Performance, 1981-1997  (percent) 
Ratio of  Ratio of 
Ratio of  Net  Noninterest  Noninterest 
Asset  Loans to  Interest  Income to 
Year  Growth  Assets  Margina  Assets 
All US.  Insured Domestic Commercial Banks 
1981  6.30  55.91  3.75  0.90 
1982  8.30  56.82  3.82  0.96 
1983  7.52  56.46  3.78  1.03 
1984  7.04  57.67  3.80  1.19 
1985  5.96  58.38  3.93  1.32 
1986  8.47  57.86  3.81  1.40 
1987  5.15  59.12  3.91  1.43 
1988  4.31  59.80  4.02  1  SO 
1989  4.56  60.64  3.99  1.62 
1990  4.74  60.53  3.94  1.67 
1991  1.23  59.55  4.10  1.79 
1992  1.86  51.30  4.42  1.95 
1993  3.60  56.25  4.42  2.13 
1994  8.33  56.06  4.38  2.00 
1995  7.40  58.39  4.31  2.02 
1996  5.54  59.91  4.33  2.19 
Midwestern Banks 
1993  14.86  61.49  4.57  2.15 
1994  42.92  60.66  4.19  2.05 
1995  11.20  61.87  3.96  2.12 
1996  5.18  64.08  3.78  2.42 
1997  14.28  59.85  2.89  2.63 
Return 
Expense to  Efficiency  on 
































































Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin (July 1987, 53842; June  1997, 479-81)  for all U.S. banks; Value Line Investment Survey (July 4, 1997) for  1993-1996 
Midwest data; 1997 data are estimates. 
"(Interest income  ~  interest expense)/earning assets. 
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two ways. First, it provides prima facie evidence that the cost savings pro- 
grams that coincide with many bank consolidation transactions may actu- 
ally be having some effect. In that regard, it is noteworthy that the Midwest 
region (where the regime change has been most dramatic) is also the region 
that has seen some of the greatest efficiency gains. Second, the evidence 
of dramatic improvements in bank efficiency supports the view that com- 
petitive pressures have been particularly pronounced during the merger 
wave, which reflects favorably on the likely motives for mergers. 
Microeconometric Analyses of Bank Consolidation 
From the standpoint of the preceding arguments about the likely effi- 
ciency gains from the merger wave currently transforming U.S. banking, 
econometric evidence of efficiency gains at the level of individual banks 
has been  surprisingly weak. Three decades of microeconomic empirical 
research in banking have failed to produce clear evidence of large gains 
from consolidation. That fact has not done much for the reputation  of 
academic analysis within the banking industry, where the gains from con- 
solidation are generally regarded as beyond reasonable doubt. How have 
the academics arrived at their conclusions, and how might one reconcile 
the econometric results of these studies with other evidence (and bankers’ 
beliefs) that consolidation is the child of competition and the mother of 
efficiency? 
Studies that have failed to find economies of scale in banking and thus 
question the potential gains from consolidation are relatively easy to dis- 
count. First, under a regulatory regime that limited bank branching (the 
regime under which scale economies were estimated), it is not surprising 
that economies of scale were hard to find. If the advantages of large size 
include operating  economies of  scale (back office  consolidation  across 
bank  offices), portfolio  diversification, and  economies associated with 
widespread marketing and client-access, then they depend on the ability 
to branch.  But  the branching  networks that would  have allowed  such 
economies of scale to be realized were absent. Thus, past measures of re- 
alized scale economies are likely to be a poor guide to potential scale econ- 
omies. Berger and Mester (1997) provide evidence consistent with that 
view. Using a database taken from the 199Os, they found potential scale 
economies significantly larger than those of previous studies. 
Second, measures of inputs and outputs are controversial in banking, 
and incomparability across banks of different sizes in inputs and outputs 
makes it particularly hard to render convincing scale comparisons. Bank- 
ing consultants, with access to better data, argue that economies of scale 
are important but are hard to identify with publicly available data. Toevs 
(1 992) provides evidence from line-of-business  data that show large econo- 
mies of scale and great potential for cost savings from within-market con- 
solidation. 
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rectly on the question of the gains from consolidation. The results of these 
studies divide into two broad  categories: (1) analyses of  the effects of 
transaction announcements on stock prices of targets and acquirers and 
(2) analyses of postmerger bank performance through bank income and 
balance sheet data. Both sets of findings have tended to produce evidence 
of meager expected or actual postconsolidation improvement, on average. 
But interpreting the evidence from these studies is difficult because of a 
variety of problems. The pitfalls that we  outline in our criticism of the ex- 
tant empirical work on mergers help to motivate our use of the case-study 
approach. 
Average Stock Price Reactions 
Studies of  stock price reactions to consolidation announcements (for 
various dates covering the period before 1992) have reported negative av- 
erage returns for acquirers, positive average returns for acquirees, and a 
zero average change in the value of the combined institutions (Beatty, San- 
tomero, and Smirlock 1987; James and Wier 1987; Wall and Gup 1988; 
Dubofsky and Fraser 1988; Kaen and Tehranian 1988; Sushka and Ben- 
deck 1988; Cornett and Tehranian  1992; Houston and Ryngaert 1994). 
Should one conclude that mergers account for little of  the gains in the 
1990s (or before) or that measures of gains based on stock price reactions 
are flawed? 
Studies that focus on stock price reactions and measure performance by 
announcement effects face several difficulties. First, stock issues (including 
stock swaps associated with acquisitions) tend to be associated with nega- 
tive price reactions for issuers and acquirers, which is generally explained 
as a result of adverse-selection (pooling) problems (Myers and  Majluf 
1984). That interpretation suggests that it is inappropriate to view negative 
average price reactions to acquirers’ announced acquisition plans as evi- 
dence that consolidation is value reducing. 
Second, the efficiency gains from consolidation may be reaped largely 
by  bank customers in a competitive market (as suggested by the evidence 
in Jayaratne and Strahan 1997). In that case, stock prices of banks might 
capture little of the efficiency gains of consolidation. Measures of  con- 
sumer surplus (convenience, transaction cost, interest rate spreads) might 
be more useful measures of efficiency gains than bank  stock prices or 
bank earnings. 
Third, if  acquisitions are anticipated,  their  positive effects  on bank 
value may not show themselves at the announcement date. Many banks 
have clearly expressed their acquisition strategies (NationsBank,  Banc- 
One, and Harris Bank, for example). Acquisition announcements  may 
provide  details about  timing and  specific targets  but  less information 
about the future shape of the bank, which may have been known to the 
market before the announcement. 
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pointment with the announced transaction  because of anticipated gains 
for consolidation transactions if some such transactions become less likely 
as the result of the announced consolidation. As we argue in our analysis 
of Firstar’s acquisitions, a possible interpretation of the market’s negative 
reaction to Firstar’s acquisition announcements is that the market believed 
Firstar’s value-maximizing strategy was to become acquired by  a larger 
superregional bank. Despite Firstar’s impressive record before these ac- 
quisitions  and  despite  its  reasonable  expectation  of  achieving  gains 
through consolidation, the market may have been disappointed by the im- 
plication of these announcements for the long-run strategy of the bank. 
Fifth, market reactions may reflect an incomplete understanding of the 
transactions. McCoy, Frieder, and Hedges (1994) contend that the nature 
of the gains from consolidation has changed over short periods during the 
past twenty years. Given the limited information from experience available 
in the market to judge the likely success of consolidations, market expecta- 
tions may be formed largely from the record of a few transactions, which 
may provide an inaccurate picture of anticipated gains when the motiva- 
tions for mergers are changing. 
Average Postmerger Performance 
Studies of postconsolidation performance often provide mixed evidence 
on typical cost savings and revenue gains from mergers and acquisitions. 
The various studies all report that acquisition targets tend to be relatively 
inefficient banks. They disagree, however, about the extent to which acqui- 
sitions help to realize potential efficiency gains. Results are sensitive to the 
type of bank being analyzed and the benchmark used for comparison. 
Some studies report little average performance improvement from consoli- 
dation. Berger and Humphrey (1992), for example, examined a sample of 
bank consolidations from 198 1 to 1989 and found little realized gains from 
mergers. Srinivasan and Wall (1992) and Rhoades (1993a) discovered no 
cost savings from mergers. 
More recent work suggests that mergers may produce significant reve- 
nue gains, despite scant cost savings. Akhavein, Berger,  and Humphrey 
(1997); Berger (1997); and Peristiani (1997) found no significant cost sav- 
ings from consolidations but did find increases in profits after consolida- 
tion, which largely reflected portfolio reallocations-the  switch from gov- 
ernment securities holdings to loans-or  improvements in asset quality. 
The first and last of these studies examine data from the 198Os, while the 
second uses data only for the period 1991-1994.  Together, those findings 
suggest that some combination of greater loan diversification opportuni- 
ties or perhaps the profitability of lending as part of a multiproduct deliv- 
ery  strategy (quasi  rent  creation)  accompanies consolidation-that  is, 
bank management is either more willing or more able to take on lending 
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Other studies of this same period do detect significant cost savings from 
consolidation. Spindt and Tarhan (1992a, 1992b) used a matched-sample 
approach to construct their performance benchmark. They concluded that 
large gains were realized by  acquirers and that the prices paid for targets 
were fair measures of expected discounted future gains from the acquisi- 
tion. Toevs (1992) provides a similarly optimistic perspective on cost sav- 
ings, using data on lines of business rather than total banking costs. Cor- 
nett  and Tehranian  (1992), who  confined  their  analysis to large bank 
holding companies, found  large increases in  postmerger performance; 
also, cross-sectional differences in ex post performance and cost savings 
were reflected in cross-sectional differences in stock market reactions to 
announcements. 
Some differences across studies-especially  the differences regarding 
cost savings-reflect  different definitions of costs and profits. Cornett and 
Tehranian (1992) focused on measures that excluded interest costs but 
have been criticized for doing so since banks with high operating costs 
may be spending more on operations to avoid higher interest costs (Berger 
1997). Differences in the samples of banks studied may also produce dif- 
ferent measures of cost savings. Spindt and Tarhan’s findings may reflect 
a high proportion of small banks in their sample. 
In  general,  the  conclusions from  the  performance-based  studies  of 
mergers are mixed. Still, they provide a more optimistic picture than the 
evidence on average stock price reactions. They also tend to emphasize 
potential gains from revenue increases rather than cost savings and show 
that those gains in revenue are not traceable to increases in market power. 
The scant evidence of postmerger improvement from some performance 
studies may be attributable to methodological pitfalls. Some problems are 
similar to those encountered in the literature about reactions of  stock 
prices-for  example, the possibility that efficiency gains will not show up 
as net earnings improvements because of competition. Other pitfalls in 
measurement are peculiar to performance comparisons. First, there is a 
selectivity bias. Nonmerging banks  (which serve as the benchmark for 
comparison) may be avoiding consolidation for good reason. Perhaps they 
are pursuing de novo branching as a method for expansion, or perhaps 
they are in a different service niche, where consolidation is not as useful. 
This selectivity bias implies that measured improvements from consolida- 
tion relative to some benchmark will understate actual improvements. 
Second, lags in performance improvement may be extensive. Transac- 
tions motivated by  pure cost cutting show benefits fastest, but even in 
these cases most industry estimates claim that cost savings take roughly 
three years to become fully realized. In the first year after a merger, costs 
often rise because of special costs from the merger itself (including special 
accounting charges and severance pay). Transactions motivated by strate- 
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to show themselves. Diversification advantages may take years to appear. 
Revenue gains from combining services to foster more profitable client 
contacts may  not  be realized  for  several years. Furthermore,  some ac- 
quirers deliberately pursue a slow path when integrating targets into the 
parent institution because they believe that doing so enhances the long- 
run profitability of the acquisition (through its effects on customer rela- 
tionships and employee morale). 
Third, during a merger wave, it is hard to construct a believable bench- 
mark  of  performance to gauge the  gains from consolidation,  and this 
problem is exacerbated by  the lags in realizing the gains of mergers. Panel 
data analysis of mergers seeks to take advantage of within-firm and across- 
firm differences in consolidation status to identify gains from consolida- 
tion. But, in the midst of a merger wave,  banks that did not acquire an 
institution in a given year are still likely to have been involved in a previous 
consolidation or are likely to be involved in one in the near future. The 
econometrician  faces  the  difficult  task  of  identifying  firm-years that 
should reflect the influence of consolidation as opposed to firm-years that 
should not. Recall that the gains of consolidation (according to bankers) 
show themselves in  bank performance with a lag and the first year  of 
consolidation often sees large expenses associated with  the transaction 
itself. Thus, constructing a meaningful comparison of merging and non- 
merging institutions to evaluate performance consequences may be  diffi- 
cult. (We  return  to the problem of constructing counterfactual  bench- 
marks in our case discussions.) 
Fourth, because one story does not fit all bank mergers, the econometri- 
cian has difficulties in identifying the benefits of  mergers. Suppose that 
there are many different ways in which mergers might improve efficiency 
(including operating cost savings, x-efficiency gains, and product sales syn- 
ergies) but that any one merger typically is motivated primarily by  only 
one of  the many possible sources of  gain (a supposition that we  argue 
below is quite realistic). In that case, econometric modeling that treats all 
mergers as the same may lead to false conclusions. Suppose that only one 
in  three mergers is motivated by  operating cost savings. Then the mea- 
sured cost  savings implied  by  simple regression  analysis of  the entire 
sample of mergers understates by a factor of three the benefits (and over- 
states coefficient standard errors) from cost reduction for the subset of 
mergers that are motivated by  cost reduction. 
From the perspective of this last critique of econometric studies of cost 
reduction, case studies may be helpful. One benefit from an analysis of 
cases is  the information provided about bank  characteristics associated 
with particular merger motivations. Those characteristics can act as a set 
of conditioning variables to be used in econometric analysis to sort banks 
according to the likely motivation of their mergers. 
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sured by  stock price reactions or by performance improvements-are  not 
reliable indicators of the true average gains. That is not to say, however, 
that merger optimists are free to ignore these pessimistic results. In addi- 
tion to the questionable findings about averages, the literature on bank 
mergers  has  reported  some  important  cross-sectional differences, and 
these cross-sectional differences suggest that not  all mergers have been 
equally value maximizing for bank stockholders. 
Cross-Sectional  Diflerences and Managerial hen  tives 
As in other industries (Jensen 1988; Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 1989; 
Shleifer and Vishny  1990, 1992; Servaes 1991; Healy, Palepu, and Ruback 
1992), some bank consolidations produced noncontroversial gains. Some 
types of bank consolidations are received with enthusiasm by  the stock 
market and offer clear evidence of  performance improvement. Acquisi- 
tions where acquirers and targets are geographically coincident and where 
cost-saving opportunities are often transparent, for example, tend to enjoy 
more favorable market  reactions  (Houston  and Ryngaert  1996, 1997). 
Some mergers offer clear, visible cost savings in the form of branch clo- 
sures and payroll  savings, while the advantages from strategic mergers 
(where management stresses product and marketing synergies or diversi- 
fication) have been harder to identify empirically. 
Recent literature has stressed the importance of managerial incentives 
for determining the success of bank consolidations. This emphasis is par- 
ticularly plausible  in  the  banking  industry. In  their  analysis of  bank 
profitability and survival, Gorton and Rosen (1995) emphasize that the 
banking industry traditionally had suffered from regulatory limits on cor- 
porate governance that insulated managers from stockholder discipline. 
Regulations effectively prevented competing banks (or commercial enter- 
prises) from acquiring inefficient banks. Gorton and Rosen argue that 
much of the exit from banking during the 1980s reflected inefficiency and 
overcapacity in bank lending resulting from the previous lack of discipline 
over management. 
Gorton and Rosen’s (1995) emphasis on tolerance for poor management 
has been echoed in many earlier studies of bank efficiency. That literature 
(summarized in Evanoff and Israelevich 199  1; Berger, Hunter, and Timme 
1993; and Peristiani 1996) finds that much of the cross-sectional variation 
among banks in efficiency is attributable to x-inefficiency (poor manage- 
ment) rather than to differences in scale, scope, or choice of inputs. The 
conclusion of these studies is that an important source of efficiency gain 
in mergers should come from taking banks away from inefficient managers 
and placing bank operations in the hands of efficient management. 
Studies of the gains or losses from bank mergers and acquisitions lend 
support to the Gorton-Rosen view that entrenched management and regu- 
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Whether one measures success by an examination of changes in bank per- 
formance after mergers or by  reactions of stock prices to consolidation 
announcements, there is enormous variation across banks, and some vari- 
ation in the benefits of consolidation can be explained by  the incentives 
and abilities of the acquiring institutions’ management. 
Allen and Cebenoyan (1991) contend that the combination of the own- 
ership share of  management and the concentration  of nonmanagement 
ownership helps to predict which consolidation transactions are most suc- 
cessful.  They  argue  that  managers  may  pursue  mergers  for  value- 
maximizing reasons or, alternatively, for selfish career objectives. Whether 
a merger deal will  be beneficial to stockholders depends on whether the 
incentives  of  managers  are  aligned  with  the  interests  of  stockholders 
(through a combination of the carrot of an ownership stake and the stick 
of stockholder discipline). Palia (1993) concludes that managers without 
a large stake in their banks tend to pursue non-value-maximizing  mergers 
for their bank’s stockholders, presumably because they seek private gains 
from the merger. Similarly, Cornett, Palia, and Tehranian (1997) find that 
the structure of  bank  CEO compensation is  an important predictor  of 
the  stock market’s reaction  to consolidation  announcements.  If  bank 
CEOs own large stakes in their banks and have highly sensitive pay-for- 
performance contracts, they tend to choose acquisition targets that inspire 
more confidence in the stock market. 
Stories of  the 1980s  for the 1990s? 
By  relating the gains from consolidation to the incentives of manage- 
ment, these studies offer plausible explanations for why  potential advan- 
tages from consolidation are not always realized. They also suggest a pos- 
sible synthesis of the contrary evidence regarding average profitability of 
mergers. Perhaps the potential gains from bank consolidation are great (as 
suggested by  cross-regime comparisons), but in many cases managerial 
incentives prevent those gains from being realized. 
What is less clear is the applicability of the evidence of postmerger per- 
formance from 1980s consolidations to the current merger wave in bank- 
ing. All the aforementioned inquiries that relate managerial incentives to 
bank efficiency and managerial consolidation decisions use pre-1992 data, 
and  many  use  samples with  an even earlier end  date. The problem in 
applying these results to the post-1992 period is that the recent period is 
one of far greater competition, far fewer barriers to entry, and significant 
improvement in performance for the industry as a whole. 
The possibility that the 1990s are different from the 1980s suggests the 
value of examining cases from the 1990s to see if efficiency gains resulting 
from mergers are larger than in the 1980s. Rhoades (1993b) reported pre- 
liminary findings of unusually high cost savings from his sample of nine 
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from 1991 and 1992. While some of his evidence pertains to 1980s transac- 
tions, he picked those transactions because he believed they were illustra- 
tive of the sorts of transactions that characterize the new wave of mergers. 
The  sample includes Wells-Crocker (1 986),  BONY-Irving (1988), First 
Union-Florida  National  (1989),  Fleetmorstar-Bank  of  New  England 
(1991), Chemical-Manufacturers Hanover (199 l), BankAmerica-Security 
Pacific (1992), Society-Ameritrust (1992), Comerica-Manufacturers  Na- 
tional (1992), and Barnett-First Florida (1992). 
As in any case analysis, one can question the representativeness of the 
sample. But, by selecting a set of cases that exemplify current transactions 
better than a representative sample of past mergers, Rhoades may actually 
have minimized selectivity bias for answering his question. His sample of 
cases was chosen according to the following criteria: large bank size (for 
both target and acquirer), large geographic overlap between acquirer and 
target,  and  explicitly  stated  motivations  of  cost  cutting.  Thus,  while 
Rhoades’s sample may have little to say about merger motivations other 
than cost cutting and while it may have little relevance for understanding 
the acquisition of small banks by large ones, it is well focused to answer the 
specific question of whether within-market consolidations between large 
banks are producing large cost savings in the  1990s. The answer seems 
affirmative. 
The case studies we  discuss below have little overlap with those studied 
by  Rhoades (Comerica-Manufacturers is the one case common to both 
samples), and  our  cases  capture  a  broader  set  of  phenomena.  Like 
Rhoades, we also provide evidence that the 1990s are different from the 
1980s. In particular, we  find that competitive pressures are lessening the 
latitude of managers and thus removing an important impediment to the 
realization of efficient consolidation. 
2  Case Studies 
In section 1 we  reviewed the existing evidence on the efficiency gains 
from bank consolidation and pointed to several possible advantages from 
an examination of individual cases of recent transactions. We posed sev- 
eral questions that helped to motivate our case studies and which we  ad- 
dress from the perspective of our nine examples. 
To what extent does the consolidation wave  reflect pure technological 
operating cost savings, as opposed to savings from increases in quasi rents 
(through improved relationship banking) or cost savings from improving 
the quality of management? Are mergers typically motivated by the same 
combination of goals, or do mergers typically reflect one goal more than 
others? Have the mergers of the 1990s produced efficiency gains? Do the 
circumstances of the cases suggest that the gains from the merger wave of 
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case studies for future econometric analysis? How important in practice 
are the methodological problems of performance studies discussed above 
(for example, realization lags, one-time charges, and difficulties of  con- 
structing reliable benchmarks)? Do the cases support the methodological 
criticisms of using stock price reactions to infer expected gains? 
To shed light on these questions, we  developed nine case studies, with 
the assistance of teams of MBA students from the 1994 commercial bank 
management course taught by  one of us (Calomiris) at the University of 
Illinois. Those case studies were originally published by  Calomiris and 
Karceski (1995). Here we  summarize and update them. After describing 
the way cases were selected, we provide a brief overview and evaluation of 
each case. 
Sample Selection and Performance Criteria 
Unlike Rhoades (1993b), we did not target a particular set of banks for 
which we  knew cost cutting, or any other motivation, was the stated objec- 
tive of the merger. Rather, student teams were allowed to select cases based 
on their own interest, with the constraint that the merger be  completed 
between 1992 and 1994. Our sample contains an unrepresentative propor- 
tion of Midwestern banks, as the location of  these banks offered more 
convenient access for student interviews of management. 
Our intent in not constraining the mergers by  type was to pull together 
a somewhat representative sample of cases. As  it turned out, our cases 
differ greatly from one another. The sizes of the banks involved, their loca- 
tions, their lines of business, and the motivations behind the mergers are 
different. Technology- or location-driven cost reductions mattered in the 
stated motivations for many of these mergers, but so did relationship ad- 
vantages or x-efficiency gains through better management. 
Analysis of Cases 
Why Merge? 
While all our case studies of bank mergers and acquisitions reflect com- 
mon competitive pressures, the most obvious lesson of the various case 
studies is the multiple motivations for combining banks. The characteris- 
tics of acquirers and acquirees and the nature of their deals reflect those 
differences. Some deals were primarily motivated by  operating cost sav- 
ings, while in one case there was no possibility of reducing operating costs 
at all. Market access to a particular client base or location was the most 
important motive in some cases, sometimes as a means to cross-sell prod- 
ucts to customers when their preexisting intermediary lacked comparative 
advantage in delivering those products. In one case, the managerial inef- 
ficiency of the target provided the largest potential gains from acquisition. 
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Boulevard-exemplify  how different the motivations and circumstances 
of  a bank acquisition can be. The Harris takeover of  Suburban was,  in 
essence, the  acquisition  of  a  reasonably  successful suburban  Chicago 
banking franchise by  a large Chicago city franchise with an aggressive 
strategy to buy customer relationships. Harris and Suburban continued 
to operate independently after the takeover, and there was virtually no 
opportunity for cost reduction  through  operating  cost  savings, execu- 
tive salaries, or x-efficiency gains. Executives and directors were not elimi- 
nated  to save overhead costs. The two  banks  and their managers had 
worked with one another for many years in the context of a correspondent 
relationship. The acquisition was a friendly, unsolicited offer made at a 
high premium. Suburban was a family-owned bank in which the concen- 
tration of ownership and control was high. Concentration of control had 
been  enhanced  by  the  issuance of  two  classes  of  common  stock.  X- 
efficiency gains from improving managerial personnel were  not  antici- 
pated. 
Harris Bank’s stock is not traded since it is a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Bank of Montreal. The stock price of Bank of Montreal showed a slight 
increase around the announcement date, although it would be inappropri- 
ate to attribute that change to such a small acquisition. What we can say, 
however, is that the Suburban acquisition and, more broadly, the first im- 
portant implementation of BMO’s Vision 2002 did not produce a negative 
reaction from the market. 
In contrast, First Bank’s acquisition of Boulevard followed Boulevard’s 
managers’ decision to sell an extremely inefficient bank to the highest bid- 
der. Boulevard was the most inefficient bank in Chicago at the time of its 
acquisition. In a sample of forty-four banks in the Chicago area, Calo- 
miris and Karceski (1994) found that  Boulevard ranked at or near the 
bottom according to every performance measure, including ROE (forty- 
second), ROA  (forty-second), net interest spread (thirty-sixth), and effi- 
ciency ratio  (forty-fourth). Boulevard’s management-which  had  long 
avoided takeover-decided  in the summer of 1993 that its best option was 
to sell the bank. Management voluntarily placed the bank on the auction 
block two months after establishing lucrative golden parachutes. One way 
to interpret that decision is that Boulevard’s management understood that 
its franchise value to an acquirer was on a declining path. If it did not sell, 
it would be out-competed by existing banks or de novo entrants and would 
face continuing losses of  customers and charter value. Under those cir- 
cumstances, entrenched management decided to exit (taking with it a sig- 
nificant share of the bank’s existing charter value) rather than maintain a 
hold on a declining institution. 
While Boulevard shareholders benefited from the deal, entrenched man- 
agement clearly extracted enormous rents as the price for allowing the 
shareholders to profit from the merger. The winning bid for Boulevard 118  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
contained a relatively small acquisition premium, and the winning bidder 
was a regional bank from a different city that specialized in trimming the 
costs of  takeover targets. In the Boulevard deal, the acquirer looked to 
achieve significant cost cutting, partly through widespread layoffs. Not 
only did Boulevard’s stock appreciate as the result of its placing itself on 
the auction block; First Bank also saw a modest increase in its stock price 
(1.1 percent absolutely and 1.7 percent relative to the Standard and Poor’s 
financial index in the two days following the acquisition announcement). 
The new competitive pressures of the 1990s encouraged both of these 
acquisitions, but the channels through which competition operated were 
different. While both deals were justified by anticipated synergies-cross- 
selling opportunities in the Harris-Suburban transaction and cost-cutting 
opportunities  in  the  First  Bank-Boulevard  deal-those  potential  effi- 
ciency gains do not explain the timing of the acquisitions. In the case of 
Boulevard, the exit strategy of inefficient management, which determined 
the timing of the deal, had changed as the result of deregulation and com- 
petition. In the Harris-Suburban case, Bank of Montreal’s aggressive Vi- 
sion 2002  relationship-based strategy for  Harris to seize market  share, 
which was set in motion in  1992, was the determining factor. 
The other seven deals reflect somewhat different motives and circum- 
stances. Table 2-1  summarizes some salient features of each of the nine 
case studies, and a slightly more detailed summary of each case appears 
in separate “deal at a glance” exhibits (tables 2-2 through 2-10). Although 
common themes run through many of the cases, the variation across the 
cases is at least as striking as the similarities. 
Two cases are virtually simultaneous acquisitions by Firstar. They share 
some important features. In both cases, the targets were mortgage special- 
ists, and Firstar’s motivation for acquiring them was expansion of market 
share in  the  important  Chicago and  Twin  Cities areas. According to 
Firstar management, the choice of targets reflected some anticipated cost 
savings but also cross-selling opportunities. Especially in the case of the 
acquisition of Investors, management claimed that Investors had special 
skills in mortgage intermediation but could not realize its full potential 
because of  limited financial resources. Firstar had both the capital and 
the customer network to allow a significant expansion of mortgage inter- 
mediation by  Investors’ mortgage group. In both acquisitions, Firstar ex- 
pected to retain the management of the preexisting banks, which it re- 
garded as capable. 
Both of Firstar’s acquisitions coincided with strong negative reactions 
in  the  stock market.  The market’s negative reactions  seem  surprising, 
given Firstar’s positive track record of  successful acquisitions in the years 
immediately before these deals, which had demonstrated its ability to real- 
ize cost savings and revenue gains from acquiring banks. 
As noted in our critique of market reactions as measures of potential Table 2-1  Key Aspects of Nine Case Studies 
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Table 2-2  Harris Bankcorp’s Acquisition of Suburban Bancorp, 1994 
Nature of  the Deal: Acquisition 















Target: Suburban Bancorp, Inc. 
Chicago 
$13.1 billion (12/31/93), BMO-$102  billion (9/31/94) 
0.90% (year ended 12/31/93) 
12.31% (year ended 12/31/93) 
75.29% (year ended 12/31/93) 
Palatine, Illinois (a Chicago suburb) 
$1.47 biliion (9/3  1/94) 
1.18% (year ended 12/31/93) 
15.28%  (year ended 12/31/93) 
67.76% (year ended 12/31/93) 
April 18, 1994 
October 1, 1994 
9.00% (12/31/93) 
14.52% (12/31/93) 
Accounting Method: Pooling of Interests 
Financial  Terms: Stock swap-each  share of Suburban Bancorp stock was exchanged for 
3.9352 shares of Bank of Montreal. The total cost of the takeover was $224 million. 
Motivation: Harris made an unsolicited offer for Suburban on March 23, 1994, to expand 
its presence in the Chicago market according to BMO’s Vision 2002 plan. No synergies 
were created other than cross-selling to existing Suburban customers. 
Other Notes: Harris paid a high premium for Suburban (2.42 times book value) and received 
a bank with a strong balance sheet and a similar organizational culture built around de- 
centralized management. The takeover was friendly, and there were no other bidders. 
Market Reaction 
BMO: There was little, if any, reaction because of the large difference in size between BMO 
and Suburban. BMO stock fell 1.94Y0  to (325.25 on April 18, 1994, while the Dow Jones 
Canadian Stock Index dropped 1.61% on the same day. 
Suburban: Suburban shares jumped dramatically on news of the takeover. The stock closed 
at $66 on April 18, 1994, representing a 33% daily gain as well as a 65% eight-day gain 
(information about the deal may have been leaked during the previous week). 
~ 
Source: Authors. 
efficiency gains, one interpretation of a negative response to an acquisition 
announcement is that the announcement disappoints another market ex- 
pectation.  In this case, before Firstar’s acquisition announcements, the 
market may have been expecting Firstar to position itself as an acquiree 
rather than as an acquirer. In the areas where Firstar operates, it suffers a 
size disadvantage relative to competing giants like Nonvest and First Bank 
System in the Twin Cities and Harris (Bank of Montreal), BankAmerica, 
Lasalle (ABN Amro), and others in Chicago. As interstate branching be- 
comes a reality, Firstar could suffer an increasing competitive disadvan- 
tage due to its limited size. Attempting to grow itself into the position to 
compete in the future may have been seen as an indication of an unwilling- 
ness to maximize its franchise value by  allowing itself to be acquired. 122  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
Table 2-3  First Bank System’s Acquisition of Boulevard Bancorp, 1994 
Nature of the Deal: Acquisition 










Tier 1 capital: 
Efficiency ratio: 
Announcement Date: 
Deadline  for Bids: 
Takeover Announcement Date: 
Completion Date: 
Target: Boulevard Bancorp, Inc. 
Minneapolis 
$26.4 billion (12/3 1/93) 
1.17% (year ended 12/31/93) 
13.8% (year ended 12/31/93) 
59.8% (year ended 12/31/93) 
Chicago 
$1.6 billion (3/25/94) 
0.45% (year ended 12/31/93) 
6.44% (year ended 12/31/93) 
83% (year ended 12/31/93) 
August 16, 1993 
September 22, 1993 
September 30, 1993 
March 26, 1994 
6.91% (1 2/3  1/93) 
Accoun ting Method: Purchase 
Financial Terms: Stock swap-each  share of  Boulevard stock  was  exchanged for 0.8132 
shares of FBS stock. FBS repurchased and exchanged 6.2 million shares at a total cost of 
$206.2 million. 
Motivation: Boulevard put itself up for sale, after establishing a lucrative $3.7 million golden 
parachute on June 21, 1993. First Bank submitted the highest bid, facilitating its entrance 
into the critical Chicago market. 
Other Notes: FBS paid only a 10% premium above Boulevard’s stock price. Boulevard was 
suffering from some commercial realty loan losses and inefficient operations. The low take- 
over premium may have been the result of other banks’ inability or unwillingness to fix 
Boulevard’s problems, as well as the golden parachutes. 
Market Reaction 
First Bank: Even with the large difference in size, FBS’s stock went up 1.14%  in the two days 
ended September 30, 1993, while the S&P 500 fell 0.56%. The combined market value of 
FBS and Boulevard declined less than the S&P financial index during the year ending 
March 25, 1994. 
Boulevard: Boulevard’s share price went up almost 3  1% from the end of June to mid-August 
1993, including a 7.53% increase in the two days ending September 30, 1993. 
Source: Authors. 
First Chicago’s acquisition of Lake Shore is a unique example of a large, 
local Chicago franchise acquiring a successful small bank catering to the 
affluent retail market around Michigan Avenue. Lake Shore’s interest in 
becoming acquired was the result of a managerial shakeup that brought 
in a new CEO who felt that the value-maximizing strategy of the bank was 
to allow itself to become acquired. This suggestion was greeted initially 
with  some alarm  by  Lake  Shore’s board  of  directors.  But  the  board 
changed its view once the potential profitability to shareholders became 
apparent. Clearly, Lake Shore was not a bank with entrenched, inefficient 
management. It was a successful bank that decided that the best use of its Is the Bank Merger Wave  of the  1990s Efficient?  123 
Table 24  Firstar’s Acquisition of First Colonial Bankshares, 1995 
Nature of the Deal: Acquisition 
Headquarters:  Milwaukee 
Total assets: 
ROA:  1.51% (year ended 12/31/94) 
ROE:  17.0% (year ended 12/31/94) 
Efficiency ratio:  60.6% (year ended 12/31/94) 
Headquarters:  Chicago 
Total assets:  $1.8 billion (9/30/94) 
ROA:  0.96% (year ended 12/31/94) 
ROE:  11.0% (year ended 12/31/94) 
Efficiency ratio: 
Buyer Firstar Corporation 
$1 5.  I billion (12/3  1/94) 
Tier 1 capital ratio:  8.20% (12/31/94) 
Target: First Colonial Bankshares Corporation (FCBC) 
Overall capital ratio:  11.67% (12/31/93) 
74% (year ended 12/31/94) 
July 29, 1994  Takeover Announcement Date: 
Approval Date:  January 31, 1995 
Accounting Method: Pooling of Interests 
Financial Terms: Stock swap-each  share of FCBC common stock was exchanged for 0.7725 
shares of Firstar common stock, and each share of FCBC preferred stock was exchanged 
for one share of Firstar  preferred stock. Firstar exchanged about 6.5 million shares of 
common stock, and the total cost of the deal was about $314 million. 
Motivation: FCBC was less profitable and efficient than its peers in the early 1990s. Manage- 
ment felt it would be difficult for FCBC to remain independent and profitable over the 
long run. With its long tradition  of expansion through  acquisitions, Firstar  wanted to 
expand significantly and consolidate its Chicago operations. 
Other Notes: Firstar paid a premium of 1.90 times book value. There were multiple bidders, 
and the deal was friendly. 
Market Reaction 
Firstar  Firstar’s common stock price fell significantly after the announcement. The stock 
dropped 3.6% on August 1,  1994, while the S&P 500 fell by  less than 0.1%. From July 4 
through August 12, Firstar declined 4.8%, though the S&P 500 was up 3.5%. 
First  Colonial: Surprisingly, FCBC’s common stock price did not increase on news of the 
takeover. The stock dropped  1.6% on August  1, 1994, and was unchanged from July 4 
through August 12. 
Source: Authors. 
franchise value-its  highly desirable customer relationships-was  to sell 
them to an acquirer. Many banks bid for Lake Shore, which was able to 
command  a  handsome  premium  from  First  Chicago.  First  Chicago 
claimed to see opportunities to both expand its retail market share and 
cut costs by combining its operations with its acquiree. The market’s reac- 
tion to First Chicago’s acquisition was slightly negative both for First Chi- 
cago and for the combined entity in the two days following the announce- 
ment. 
The merger between Comerica and Manufacturers National is a unique 
case among the nine: it was a merger of equals. Both banks were in the 124  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
Table 2-5  Firstar’s Acquisition of Investors Bank Corporation, 1995 
Nature of  the Deal: 















Target: Investors Bank Corporation 
Acquisition 
Milwaukee 
$15.1 billion (12/31/94) 
1.51% (year ended 12/31/94) 
17.0% (year ended 12/31/94) 
60.6% (year ended 12/31/94) 
8.20% (12/31/94) 
Minneapolis/St. Paul 
$1.4 billion (5/1/95) 
1.03% (year ended 12/31/94) 
21.6% (year ended  12/31/94) 
61.2% (year ended 12/31/94) 
August 19, 1994 
May I, 1995 
6.41% (1 2/3 1/93) 
Accounting Method: Pooling of  Interests 
Finuncial  Terms: Stock swap-each  share of  Investors common stock was exchanged for 
0.8676 shares of Firstar common stock, and each share of Investors preferred stock was 
exchanged for $27.50 in cash. The total cost of the takeover was $106 million. 
Motivation: Investors started to consider putting itself up for sale in late 1993. The size and 
expertise of Investors mortgage banking division were particularly  attractive to Firstar, 
which wanted to diversify its holdings. Management expects some cross-selling opportuni- 
ties and eventual efficiency gains. 
Other Notes: Piper Jaffray estimated the takeover premium at 21.8%, slightly above average 
for the takeover of a similarly sized Midwest thrift. The deal was friendly, and there were 
no other bidders. 
Market Reaction 
Firstar: Firstar’s common stock price fell after the announcement. In the week after the 
announcement, Firstar’s stock dropped 0.4%, while the S&P financial index was up 2.2%). 
From July  15 to August  19, the stock fell by  5.16% (S&P financial index rose O.88o/,), 
though this was partially  the result  of the announcement of the Firstar-First  Colonial 
deal on July 29, 1994. 
Investors: Investors’ share price drastically increased with the takeover. In the week after the 
announcement, Investors’ stock climbed 3.06%, and from July 15 through August 19, the 
share price rose 30.67%. 
Source: Authors. 
middling size category, and their futures as independent franchises-like 
those of Firstar and First Chicago-were  in doubt. Despite the fact that 
the merger can be understood partly as a defensive action against future 
acquisition, management argued that there were strong cost-saving oppor- 
tunities and product complementarities between the two banking organi- 
zations that made the merger desirable. As the result of the acquisition, 
1,800  jobs were eliminated (mainly through attrition and early retirement). 
Product complementarities within the context of relationship building 
were also key  to the motivations  of management; management at both Is the Bank Merger Wave  of the 1990s Efficient?  125 
Table 2-6  First Chicago’s Acquisition of Lake Shore Bancorp, 1994 
Nature of  the Deal: Acquisition 
Buyer First Chicago Corporation (FCC) 
Headquarters:  Chicago 
Total assets:  $56.9 billion (12/31/93) 
ROA:  1  .So% (year ended 12/31/93) 
ROE:  23.0% (year ended 12/31/93) 
Tier 1 capital ratio:  8.80% (12/31/93) 
Efficiency ratio:  54.2% (year ended 12/31/93) 
Headquarters:  Chicago 
Total assets: 
ROA:  1.03% (year ended 12/31/93) 
ROE:  10.04% (year ended 12/31/93) 
Efficiency ratio: 
Target: Lake Shore Bancorp 
$I .3 billion (7/8/94) 
Tier 1 capital ratio:  10.02% (12/31/93) 
62.1% (year ended 12/31/93) 
Announcement Date:  September 21, 1993 
Takeover Announcement Date:  November 22, 1993 
Completion Date:  July 8, 1994 
Accounting Method: Pooling of  Interests 
Financial  Terms: Stock swap based on FCC’s twenty-day average closing share price just 
prior to the official completion date. Each share of LSB stock was exchanged for 0.625 
shares of FCC stock. FCC issued about 6.2 million shares at a cost of $323 million. 
Motivation: Lake Shore decided to put itself up for sale since its performance and the heated 
acquisition market  afforded a high takeover premium.  FCC won  the bidding war  and 
received a highly visible and consistently profitable bank in downtown Chicago. 
Other Nores:  FCC paid a high premium for Lake Shore (2.5 times book value), partially 
caused by  bids from as many as fifteen other institutions. This was a friendly takeover. 
Some top LSB managers exercised golden parachutes. 
Market Reaction 
First  Chicago: There was little, if any, reaction  due to the large difference in size between 
FCC and LSB. The combined market value of FCC and LSB dropped slightly relative to 
the S&P Financial index from May 1993 to June 1994. 
Lake Shore: LSB’s share price rose dramatically in late August 1993 as word leaked out that 
Lake Shore was  looking for a buyer. Over the three-month period  beginning in mid- 
August 1993, LSB’s shares went up by 30%. 
Source: Authors. 
banks viewed  the development and maintenance of  long-term relation- 
ships with customers as central to their strategies. An important product 
complementarity between the two banks that management expected to 
develop as the result of the merger was the cross-selling of trust services 
to the managers of corporate customers. Comerica had the better trust 
service division, while Manufacturers  had  the more valuable corporate 
relationships. The market reaction to the merger announcement was posi- 
tive for both Comerica and Manufacturers. Stock prices of  each entity, 
and thus of the combined entity, jumped nearly 16 percent in the two days 
following the announced merger. 126  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
Table 2-7  Comerica and Manufacturers National-A  Merger of Equals, 1992 
Nature of the Deal: Merger 
Buyer Comerica Inc. 
Headquarters:  Detroit 
Total assets:  $14.4 billion (12/31/91) 
ROA:  1.06% (year ended 12/31/91) 
ROE:  15.90% (year ended 12/31/91) 
Tier 1 capital ratio: 
Efficiency ratio: 
Headquarters:  Detroit 
Total assets: 
ROA:  1.02% (year ended 12/31/91) 
ROE:  15.31%  (year ended 12/31/91) 
Efficiency ratio: 
6.60% (1 2/3  119 1) 
71.1% (year ended 12/31/91) 
Target: Manufacturers National Bank 
$13.5 billion (  12/3  1/9  1) 
Tier 1 capital ratio:  6.68% (12/31/91) 
64.0% (year ended 12/31/91) 
Announcement Date:  October 28, 1991 
Completion Date:  June 18. 1992 
Accounting Method: Pooling of  Interests 
Financial Terms: Stock swap-each  of the 3  1.2 million outstanding shares of Manufacturers 
common stock was exchanged for 0.81 shares of Comerica common stock. 
Motivation: Both banks were concerned about being targets of future, possibly hostile take- 
over activity. Comerica and Manufacturers had similar corporate cultures that emphasized 
long-term customer relationships. The banks’ areas of expertise complemented each other 
well, allowing for cross-selling and additional market share expansion opportunities. 
Other Notes: There were no other interested parties involved in the negotiations, and the 
deal was friendly. About  1,800 jobs were cut, but most  of  this reduction in force was 
facilitated through early retirement and normal attrition. 
Market Reaction 
Comerica: ln the five-day period ended November 1, 1991, Comerica’s stock price jumped 
15.5% compared with a corresponding increase in the S&P financial index of 3.4% over 
the same period. 
Manufacturers: In the five-day period ended November 1, 1991, Manufacturers National’s 
stock price increased 15.9%. 
Source: Authors. 
NationsBank’s acquisition of  Maryland National  Corporation  com- 
bined a large, high-performance bank with a struggling, middling-sized 
institution. Maryland National found itself in dire straits as a result of 
overexposure to local real estate loan losses. The main attraction for Na- 
tionsBank was gaining a foothold in a region that it had targeted for ex- 
pansion. Acquiring distressed institutions at low cost has been a key feature 
of NationsBank’s strategy for interregional expansion; knowing how  to 
structure and execute such acquisitions is considered a comparative ad- 
vantage of NationsBank. Maryland National was not considered a desir- 
able takeover for many banks because of its loan portfolio problems. 
NationsBank’s strong bargaining position allowed it to pay a small pre- 
mium over book value and attach stringent conditions to its offer, giving it Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990s Efficient?  127 
Table 2-8  Takeover of MNC Financial by  NationsBank, 1993 
Nature of the Deal: Acquisition 
Buyer: NationsBank Corporation 
Headquarters:  Charlotte 
Total assets: 
ROA:  1.00% (year ended 12/31/92) 
ROE:  15.8%  (year ended 12/31/92) 
Shareholders’ equity to total assets:  6.62% (12/31/92) 
Noninterest expense to total assets:  3.36% (year ended 12/31/92) 
Headquarters:  Baltimore 
Total assets:  $16.5 billion (9/30/93) 
ROA: 
ROE:  7.8% (year ended 12/31/92) 
Shareholders’ equity to total assets: 
Noninterest expense to total assets: 
$1 18.1 billion (  12/31/92) 
Target: Maryland National Corporation (MNC) 
0.60% (year ended 12/3  1/92) 
7.84% (12/31/92) 
4.30% (year ended 12/31/92) 
July  17, 1992 
February 18, 1993 
Announcement of Initial Agreement: 
Exercise of the Full Purchase Option: 
Completion Date:  October 1, 1993 
Accounting Method: Pooling of Interests 
Financial Terms: NationsBank initially paid $200 million for a 17% stake in MNC through 
preferred stock along with an option to acquire the remaining 83% within five years. Upon 
exercise of this option, MNC shareholders had the option to exchange each share of MNC 
stock for $15.17 in cash or 0.2985 shares of NationsBank common stock. This resulted in 
an extra cost to NationsBank of about $700 million, including the issuance of up to 13.6 
million new shares. 
Motivation: MNC initiated the deal, driven by  an overexposure to real estate risk in the 
Maryland-Washington,  D.C., area. NationsBank seized the opportunity  to establish a 
stronghold in the Northeastern region of the United States. 
Other Notes: NationsBank  paid  a low takeover premium (about  1.25 times MNCS book 
value). MNC was eager to be  acquired, and other large banks were wary of potential 
hidden problems with MNC’s real estate holdings. 
Market Reaction 
NationsBank: The reaction was positive. NationsBank stock rose 6.1% during the two days 
surrounding the bank’s decision to purchase all of MNC. 
MNC: The reaction was positive and remarkably noise free. MNC stock took a one-time 
jump of 9.7% between February 18 and 19, 1993, and increased just slightly thereafter. 
Source: Authors. 
the option to cancel the agreement if large, hidden loan problems became 
apparent. The low price of the acquisition and its locational advantage for 
NationsBank produced an unusually positive appreciation (6.1 percent) 
of the acquirer’s stock over the two days following its announcement. 
Mercantile’s acquisition of United Postal Bancorporation saw the ab- 
sorption of a small S&L by one of the dominant regional banks operating 
in the same market (St. Louis). The closing of overlapping branch facilities 
would provide some opportunity for operating cost savings. But United 
Postal was attractive to Mercantile primarily because of its comparative 
advantage in mortgage retailing, which reflected its innovative and effi- 128  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
Table 2-9  Purchase of Farm & Home by Roosevelt Financial Group, 1994 
Nature of  the Deal: Acquisition 
Buyer Roosevelt Financial Group, Inc. (RFG) 
Headquarters:  St. Louis 
Total assets:  $4.47 billion (12/31/93) 
ROA:  0.90% (year ended 12/31/93) 
ROE:  18.2% (year ended 12/31/93) 
Efficiency ratio: 
Headquarters:  St. Louis 
Total assets:  $3.57 billion (12/31/93) 
ROA:  0.24% (year ended 12/31/93) 
ROE:  4.83% (year ended 12/31/93) 
Tier 1 capital ratio: 
Efficiency ratio: 
Tier  1 capital ratio:  2.73% (12/31/93) 
36.86% (year ended 12/31/93) 
Target: Farm & Home Financial Corporation (F&H) 
2.29% (12/31/93) 
69.87% (year ended 12/31/93) 
December 3, 1993  Takeover Announcement Date: 
Completion Date:  June 30, 1994 
Accounting Method: Pooling of  Interests 
Financial  Terms: Stock swap-each  share of F&H common stock was exchanged for 0.67 
shares of RFG common stock. The total cost of the takeover was about $258 million, and 
RFG issued about 18 million common shares. 
Motivation: Hired by  F&H to provide advice on strategic alternatives, Bankers Trust recom- 
mended  that  F&H look  for  an acquirer. RFG was  expanding its holdings rapidly to 
achieve a size that would allow it to remain independent over the long run. The deal was 
motivated more by cost-cutting opportunities than by prospects for revenue growth. 
Other Notes: RFG paid a premium of 40% above current market value at the time of the 
announcement. The deal was friendly, and there was probably at least one other bidder. 
Market Reaction 
Roosevelt: There was little market reaction to the deal. In the two-week period from Novem- 
ber 24 through December 8, 1993, RFG’s stock price was unchanged, while the S&P fi- 
nancial index increased 3.76% over the same period. 
Farm & Home: There was a large positive reaction to the takeover announcement. In the 
two-week period from November 24 through December 8, 1993, F&H’s common stock 
price went up by  44.1%. 
Source: Authors. 
cient management. Mercantile hoped  to see cross-selling opportunities, 
particularly between consumer credit and mortgage credit. Thus, the ac- 
quisition largely sought to combine Mercantile’s existing customer net- 
work with the technical skills of United Postal’s mortgage unit. 
The capital gains enjoyed by  United Postal’s stockholders illustrate the 
magnitude of  the potential gains to the skillful management of  a retail 
mortgage business. Its stock-holders enjoyed a 600 percent capital gain on 
their  investment  over  only  eighteen months.  Mercantile’s  stock  price 
showed little or no relative decline on the announcement of the deal (its 
stock price remained unchanged, but other financial stocks rose by  an Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990s Efficient?  129 
Table 2-10  Mercantile’s Takeover of United Postal, 1994 
Nature of the Deal: Acquisition 
Buyer Mercantile Bancorporation 
Headquarters:  St. Louis 
Total assets:  $12.2 billion (12/31/93) 
ROA:  0.97% (year ended 12/31/93) 
ROE:  13.0% (year ended 12/31/93) 
Tier 1 capital ratio:  1  1  .O6% (1 2/3  1/93) 
Efficiency ratio:  64.0% (year ended 12/31/93) 
Headquarters:  St. Louis 
Total assets:  $1.3 billion (12/31/93) 
No data are available for UPBI since the firm went public in 1992. 
Target: United Postal Bancorporation, Inc. (UPBI) 
Takeover Announcement Date: 
UPBI Shareholder Approval Date: 
Completion Date:  February 2,  1994 
August 17, 1993 
December 16, 1993 
Accounting Method: Pooling of Interests 
Financial Terms: Stock swap-each  share of  UPBI stock was exchanged for 0.6154 shares 
of Mercantile stock. The total cost of the takeover was $177 million. 
Motivation: Mercantile was engaged in a series of acquisitions in the early 1990s in response 
to regulatory changes that increased competition in Missouri banking. United Postal real- 
ized it was too small to remain independent and so chose to agree to the merger with Mer- 
cantile. 
Other Notes: Mercantile paid a premium of 27% over UPBI’s market value as of August 16, 
1993. There were no other bids, and the deal was friendly. 
Market Reaction 
Mercantile: There was little market reaction  to the deal, especially since the total market 
value of UPBI was only about 12% of Mercantile’s total market capitalization at the time 
of the announcement. In the two-day trading period ending August 20, 1993, Mercantile’s 
stock price was unchanged, while the S&P financial index was up about 2%. 
United Postal: There was a large positive reaction to the takeover announcement. In the two- 
day trading period ending August 20,  1993, UPBI stock went up 18%. Original UPBI 
shareholders (those who purchased shares during the IPO in the middle of  1991) had a 
capital gain of about 600% over an eighteen-month holding period. 
Source: Authors. 
average of  2 percent over the two-day postannouncement  window). The 
value of the combined entity increased slightly on the announcement of 
the merger. 
The final case is the friendly combination of two Missouri thrift institu- 
tions of similar size, Roosevelt Financial (the acquirer) and Farm & Home 
Financial. The predicted gains from the merger were cost reductions. The 
acquiree was  suffering high costs and poor earnings and was  searching 
for a suitor that could provide cost savings and the resources to permit 
continuing growth. The acquirer was pursuing acquisitions to cut average 
cost. The stock market reaction to the announced acquisition was highly 
favorable. Roosevelt’s stock price was essentially unchanged, while Farm 130  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
& Home’s stock price rose 44 percent over the two weeks  following the 
announcement. The value of the combined entity thus rose significantly. 
Were Acquired Advertised Gains Real? 
To evaluate these cases, we  ask whether acquirers’ claims of anticipated 
efficiency gains from the mergers were plausible ex ante and whether ex 
post results are consistent with those claims. Our perspectives on these 
questions are based on available public data. The availability of relevant 
information is  not  identical across cases. Nevertheless, we  can address 
these questions reasonably well  in most cases. In evaluating whether ac- 
quirers’ claims were plausible ex ante, we  look at the performance of  ac- 
quirers at the time of the acquisition announcement. Were acquirers rela- 
tively efficient banks with relatively high franchise value (and thus likely 
able to realize potential  gains), or were they struggling institutions  at- 
tempting to expand their size to discourage would-be acquirers? Were ac- 
quisitions associated with improvements in relative performance? 
Tables 2-1 1 through 2-17 examine pre- and postmerger performance for 
our list of  acquirers and acquirees, sometimes at the bank holding com- 
pany level and, where available and relevant, at the chartered bank level. 
In each case, we  compare our list of banks with constructed benchmarks 
that provide the most relevant comparisons. We emphasize that our goal 
is not to prove the advertised benefits of these mergers but rather to ask 
whether acquirers’ claims were plausible in light of available evidence and 
to investigate whether and to what extent our case studies confirm the 
broader methodological critiques of earlier studies, outlined previously. 
Harris-Suburban 
Harris’s acquisition  of  Suburban provides a  unique  opportunity  to 
gauge the potential value of cross-selling synergies as the motivation for 
bank  mergers.  This  acquisition  achieved  virtually  no  cost  reductions 
through  the consolidation of  operations  or management since Harris’s 
strategy with  Suburban (and other acquirees) has been to preserve the 
independence and  separateness of  existing management.  Furthermore, 
Harris acquired no other banks between 1990 and 1996 (in part because 
of regulatory pressures on Harris to improve its compliance with the Com- 
munity Reinvestment Act before continuing its expansion plans). Thus, 
measured postmerger gains through  1996 are not complicated by  addi- 
tional acquisitions. (In  1997, Harris acquired Household  Bank, adding 
fifty-four banking locations and bringing to fruition its Vision 2002 goal 
of a 140-branch distribution network five years ahead of schedule.) 
The Harris-Suburban transaction is of particular interest given the nat- 
ural suspicion with which many observers of corporate mergers greet the 
idea of revenue synergies. In other industries, acquisitions that lack visible 
opportunities for cost reduction-typically  justified by revenue synergies Table 2-11  Postmerger Performance of Harris-Suburban, 1992-1997  (percent) 
Loans  Net  Noninterest  Noninterest  Return  Earnings 
Asset  to  Interest  Income to  Expense to  Efficiency  on  per Share 




Suburban f 12d 
Suburban only 
Ten unaffiliated banks' 
Lasalle banks' 
Firstar Bank, Illinoisg 
First National Bank of Chicagoh 
Harris (BHC) 
Harris banks 
Suburban + 12 
Suburban only 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
Lasalle banks 
Firstar Bank, Illinois 




































































































































(continued) Table 2-11  (continued) 
Year and Bank 
Loans  Net  Noninterest  Noninterest  Return  Earnings 
Asset  to  Interest  Income to  Expense to  Efficiency  on  per Share 




Suburban + 12 
Suburban only 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
Lasalle banks 
Firstar Bank, Illinois 




Suburban + 12 
Suburban only 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
Lasalle banks 
Firstar Bank, Illinois 





































































































































































NA Suburban + 12 
Suburban only 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
Lasalle banks 
Firstar Bank, Illinois 





Suburban + 12 
Suburban only 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
Lasalle banks 
Firstar Bank, Illinois 


































































































































Source: Holding company data are taken from annual reports; chartered bank data are from Federal Reserve Call Reports. The 1997 statistics are estimates 
based on first-quarter results. 
"Noninterest expense/(interest income + noninterest income -  interest expense). 
bHarris bank holding company. 
cIncludes all Chicagoland chartered banks within Harris (the parent bank, the twelve Harris independent banks, and Suburban). 
dSame  as note c but excludes parent bank. 
'Aggregate of unaffiliated Chicago banks constructed by  the authors as a nonconsolidation benchmark (see text for details). 
'Aggregate of Lasalle's Chicagoland chartered banks (comparable to Harris banks). 
ZIllinois chartered bank of Firstar. 
hParent chartered bank of First Chicago. 
'Value Line Midwest bank index from table 1-3. Table 2-12  Postmerger Performance of First Bank and NationsBank, 19921996 (percent) 
Loans  Net  Noninterest  Noninterest  Return  Earnings 
Asset  to  Interest  Income to  Expense to  Efficiency  on  per Share 

















































































































































































Source: Holding company data are taken from annual reports; chartered bank data are from Federal Reserve Cull Reports. 
"Noninterest expense/(interest income + noninterest income -  interest expense). 
hBank holding company. 
Value Line Midwest index from table 1-3. Table 2-13  Postmerger Performance of Firstar, 1992-1997  (percent) 
Loans  Net  Noninterest  Noninterest  Return  Earnings 
Asset  to  Interest  Income to  Expense to  Efficiency  on  per Share 




Firstar Bank, Illinoisd 
First Colonial (BHC)' 




Firstar Bank, Illinois 
First Colonial (BHC) 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
Firstar (BHC) 
Midwest banks 
U.S.  banks 
Firstar Bank, Illinois 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
Firstar (BHC) 
Midwest banks 
U.S.  banks 
Firstar Bank, Illinois 










































































































































































(continued) Table 2-13  (continued) 
Loans  Net  Noninterest  Noninterest  Return  Earnings 
Asset  to  Interest  Income to  Expense to  Efficiency  on  per Share 





Firstar Bank, Illinois 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
Firstar Bank, Illinois 



































































Source: Holding company data are taken from annual reports; chartered bank data are from Federal Reserve Call Reports. The 1997 statistics are estimates 
based on first-quarter results. 
"Noninterest expense/(interest income + noninterest income -  interest expense). 
bFirstar bank holding company. 
cAggregate of all chartered US. banks from table 1-3. 
dFirstar Bank, Illinois, an Illinois chartered bank. 
cFirst Colonial bank holding company. 
'Aggregate of all unaffiliated Chicago banks constructed by the authors as a nonconsolidation benchmark (see text for details). 
Value Line Midwest bank index from table 1-3. Table 2-14  Postmerger Performance of First Chicago, 1992-1997  (percent) 
Year and Bank 
Loans  Net  Noninterest  Noninterest  Return  Earnings 
Asset  to  Interest  Income to  Expense to  Efficiency  on  per Share 
Growth  Assets  Margin  Assets  Assets  Ratioa  Equity  ($) 
1992 
First Chicago Corp. (BHC)b 
First National Bank of Chicago" 
American National Bankd 
U.S. bankse 
Ten unaffiliated banks' 
First Chicago Corp. (BHC) 
First National Bank of Chicago 
American National Bank 
Midwest banksg 
U.S. banks 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
First Chicago Corp. (BHC) 
First National Bank of Chicago 
American National Bank 
Midwest banks 
U.S. banks 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
First Chicago Corp. (BHC) 
First National Bank of Chicago 










































































































































































(continued) Table 2-14  (continued) 
Year and Bank 
Loans  Net  Noninterest  Noninterest  Return  Earnings 
Asset  to  Interest  Income to  Expense to  Efficiency  on  per Share 
Growth  Assets  Margin  Assets  Assets  Ratio"  Equity  ($1 
U.S. banks 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
First Chicago Corp. (BHC) 
First National Bank of Chicago 
American National Bank 
Midwest banks 
U.S. banks 
Ten unaffiliated banks 
1997 (estimated) 
First Chicago National Bank 
Midwest banks 


























































































Source: Holding company data are taken from annual reports; chartered bank data are from Federal Reserve Cull Reports. The 1997 statistics are estimates 
based on first-quarter results. 
"Noninterest expense/(interest income + noninterest income -  interest expense). 
bFirst  Chicago's holding company. 
cMain chartered bank within the  holding company. 
dFCC's specialist in middle-market business lending. 
'Aggregate of all chartered U.S. banks from table 1-3. 
'Aggregate  of all unaffiliated Chicago banks constructed by  the authors as a nonconsolidation benchmark (see text for details) 
Walue Line Midwest bank index from table 1-3. Table 2-15  Postmerger Performance of Comerica, 1992196  (percent) 
Year and Bank 
Loans  Net  Noninterest  Noninterest  Return  Earnings 
Asset  to  Interest  Income to  Expense to  Efficiency  on  per Share 
Growth  Assets  Margin  Assets  Assets  Ratio"  Equity  ($1 
1992 
Comerica (BHC)b 
Old Kent (BHC)b 
U.S. banksc 
Comerica (BHC) 











































































































































































Source: Holding company data are taken from annual reports; chartered bank data are from Federal Reserve CuN  Reports. 
"Noninterest expense/(interest income + noninterest income -  interest expense). 
bBank holding company. 
'Aggregate of all chartered U.S. banks from table 1-3. 
dValue Line Midwest bank index from table 1-3. Table 2-16  Postmerger Performance of Mercantile and Roosevelt, 1992-1996  (percent) 
Year and Bank 
Loans  Net  Noninterest  Noninterest  Return  Earnings 
Asset  to  Interest  Income to  Expense to  Efficiency  on  per Share 


















4.92  38.91 
15.54  61.93 
8.45  52.93 
1.86  57.30 
25.77  35.18 
5.01  60.03 
9.27  54.55 
14.86  61.49 
3.60  56.25 
11.02  36.43 
1  .so  62.12 
6.13  56.74 
42.92  60.66 







































































































































































Source: Holding company data are taken from annual reports; chartered bank data are from Federal Reserve Call Reports. 
“Noninterest expense/(interest income + noninterest income  ~  interest expense). 
bBank holding company. 
“Aggregate  of all chartered U.S. banks from table 1-3. 
dValue Line Midwest bank index from table 1-3. Table 2-17  Bank Stock Performance, 1990-1996 
One-Year Return (Dec.)  Two-Year Return (Dec.) 
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11.6  54.4  72.3 
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53.7  39.2 
































7.7  33.5  314.0 
129.3 
43.8 Market-to-Book Value (End-of-April) 
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Source: Prices and shares are from Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). Book values (which exclude preferred stock) are from annual reports 
and are prior December figures. 
Note: Returns are defined in percentage terms. The use of April stock prices allows comparisons of book values and market values after book value statistics 
had been made public. 
"For 1996, the market-to-book ratio for First Chicago is for First Chicago-NBD. 144  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
-often  have performed  poorly and may have been motivated more by 
managerial rent seeking than by profit maximization. Are cross-selling op- 
portunities in banking real or just the newest justification for managerial 
empire building? Of our nine cases, Harris-Suburban provides the clearest 
window to view that question. 
Harris’s management regards the Suburban merger as a success story. 
According to Charles Tonge, the operating officer responsible for imple- 
menting Harris’s takeover strategy in the Chicago area, revenue growth at 
Suburban (the key objective for the acquisition) has exceeded preacquisi- 
tion expectations. The primary sources of revenue growth envisioned at 
the time of the merger were (1) combining Suburban’s comparative advan- 
tage in access to low-cost deposits and customer relationships with Har- 
ris’s  other  banking  affiliates’ comparative advantage in marketing and 
originating loans to increase Suburban’s loan-to-asset  ratio and the net 
interest margin for the new combined entity and (2) boosting fee income 
by  bringing Harris’s expertise in trust and asset management to Subur- 
ban’s customers and by combining Harris’s expertise in residential mort- 
gage origination and resale with Suburban’s mortgage origination oppor- 
tunities.  According  to Tonge, home equity lending,  asset management 
services, and other new products and services have permitted significant 
cross-selling and up selling (which he defines as moving existing customers 
up to longer-term, higher-margin products and services, in addition to 
simply selling them more products and services). 
Tonge believes Harris’s success reflected not only the types of revenue 
synergies that  the bank  planned  to exploit, but  the strategic decisions 
made about how to do so. 
In order of importance, the three key strategic decisions were, first, to 
target rapid growth to lock in customer relationships before other en- 
trants had a chance; second, to set the right  incentives for the bank 
presidents [of the acquired affiliates] by granting them separate account- 
ing and managerial independence and rewarding high growth rather 
than simply current ROE; and third, to keep acquisition costs down 
by  demonstrating a commitment to de novo branching as a potential 
alternative to acquisition. (Tonge 1997) 
Tonge also emphasizes that the future profitability of Harris’s Chicago- 
land operations will depend on its ability to cut costs by promoting PC  (per- 
sonal computer) banking, now in its infancy. 
Harris’s growth reflects not only its newly acquired customer base but 
the new customers that its expanded network has allowed it to attract. In 
terms of household contacts, the acquisition of Suburban coincided with 
a remarkable internal growth in Harris’s customer base of roughly 30,000 
households per year over and above those acquired directly in its acquisi- Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990s Efficient?  145 
tions, according to internal bank calculations. With its recent acquisition 
of Household, Harris now serves over 800,000 households, or one-fifth of 
all Chicagoland households (compared with one-fourteenth in 1994). 
Tonge sees the primary advantages from the acquisition as combining 
Suburban’s customer contacts and deposit accounts with the lending ex- 
pertise  developed  in  Harris’s  pre-Suburban  Chicagoland  acquisitions 
(which we  label the twelve Harris community banks). To investigate that 
claim, in table 2-11 we  report performance measures for Harris in four 
different ways: for the holding company as a whole, for the Chicagoland 
chartered banks within the holding company taken together (the parent 
bank, plus the twelve independents, plus Suburban), for Suburban plus 
the twelve  independents taken together, and for Suburban alone. Main- 
taining separate charters for its acquired banks permits this decomposi- 
tion. Being a subsidiary of the Bank of Montreal, however, precludes the 
use of market-based benchmarks (stock returns or market-to-book value 
ratios). 
For purposes  of comparison,  we  report  several performance  bench- 
marks. One of those benchmarks is a composite of ten unaffiliated Chicago- 
land banks, each of which had assets in excess of  $250 million in  1993 
(with aggregate assets of $7.25 billion in that year) and remained indepen- 
dent from 1991 through 1996. While this constructed composite may have 
some survivorship bias, we  found that the  1993 ROE for the composite 
equaled the median of Chicagoland banks in 1993. Thus, the intertempo- 
ral changes experienced by this group represent a reasonable counterfac- 
tual of what Suburban’s changes would have been had it remained inde- 
pendent. The other benchmarks for comparison  are the  S&P Midwest 
banking industry composite and several individual Chicagoland banks. Of 
these individual banks, Lasalle is most like Harris-it  is owned by Dutch 
giant ABN Amro and has pursued an aggressive strategy of seizing market 
share by  acquisitions in recent years. Firstar Bank Illinois and First Na- 
tional Bank of Chicago are included for comparison because their primary 
business is retail banking in Chicago. 
As table 2-1 1 shows, Suburban enjoyed rapid postacquisition loan and 
revenue growth during 1995 and 1996. Over those two years, total assets 
grew from $1.5 billion to $1.9 billion, while the loan-to-asset ratio rose 
from 44.1 percent to 59.4 percent. The comparable increases for the com- 
posite of Suburban and the twelve Harris independents were $5.7 billion 
from $4.6 billion in total assets and 63.7 percent  from 53.0 percent  in 
the loan-to-asset ratio. Compared with other banks, the loan growth of 
Harris’s retail banking affiliates has been large. The composite of ten un- 
affiliated Chicagoland banks saw lower asset growth than Suburban (or 
Suburban plus the twelve Harris independents) and less increase in the 
loan-to-asset  ratio.  Only  Lasalle  Bank,  which  has  pursued  a  similar 146  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
revenue-oriented acquisition strategy, has seen higher asset growth than 
Suburban  (or  Suburban-cum-Harris  independents)  and  has  reached  a 
comparably high loan-to-asset ratio. 
The growth in assets and customers achieved by Harris’s independent 
retail banking affiliates was achieved without sacrificing net interest mar- 
gin and alongside reductions in the ratio of noninterest expenses to total 
assets. That is, loan growth has not been achieved by reducing the profit- 
ability of  lending or by  spending a lot of  resources to attract low-cost 
deposits (through large noninterest expenses). The combination of  high 
margins and high loan growth has resulted in high ROE and an improved 
(lowered) efficiency ratio. 
While these facts seem to bear out Harris’s claims for the profitability 
of its revenue-oriented acquisition strategy, the parent bank has not gained 
as much as its affiliates have, and one can question whether some costs of 
growing the affiliates may have been borne by the parent bank. Taken as 
a whole, Harris’s Chicagoland banking operation (that is, the parent bank 
plus Suburban plus the twelve Harris independents) has shown ROE com- 
parable to that  of  the  ten  unaffiliated banks,  although Harris  outper- 
formed Lasalle and First National Bank of Chicago. 
There are two ways  to read the evidence on Harris. According to a 
sanguine view, Harris’s rapid loan growth and the new customer relation- 
ships that it has captured will now set the stage for growth in total ROE 
through future growth in revenue per customer. According to that view, 
the low current profitability of Harris and of other banks based in Chicago 
(compared with the rest of the Midwest) reflects the aggressive competi- 
tion for market share today to lock in valuable relationships for the future. 
An alternative, jaundiced  view  would point more skeptically to the low 
current ROE of Harris taken as a whole and question the future growth 
in the profitability of retail banking in Chicagoland and the desirability of 
having invested the Bank of Montreal’s capital there. Whatever one’s view, 
however, Harris seems to have achieved its short-term asset and revenue 
growth goals for its independents in the mid-1990s through its acquisition 
strategy. Whether those goals were wisely chosen remains to be seen. 
First Bank-Boulevard  and NationsBank-MNC 
Because First Bank  does not maintain  a separate Illinois state bank 
charter, it is not possible to examine the postmerger performance of the 
Chicago operations of First Bank-Boulevard.  By  any measure, however, 
First  Bank’s  expansion  strategy  is  extremely  successful.  If  Boulevard 
needed a high-performance acquirer to lower its costs and boost its reve- 
nue, First Bank seems to fit that description. 
At the time of its acquisition of Boulevard in early 1994, First Bank had 
a market-to-book ratio of 1.91 (one of the highest in the industry). From Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990s Efficient?  147 
January 1994 through December 1995, First Bank’s stockholders received 
a two-year return of 72.3 percent, and its market-to-book  ratio rose to 
3.05 by April 1996. As shown in table 2-12, First Bank’s ROE in 1995 and 
1996 are far above nationwide or Midwest benchmarks, and its earnings 
per share more than doubled from the end of 1993 to the end of  1996. 
This exceptional performance from the end of 1993 to the end of 1996 re- 
flects a combination of a dramatic fall in noninterest expenses relative to 
assets, a persistently high net interest margin, and growth in noninterest 
income that has kept pace with asset growth. 
First  Bank  continues to expand  aggressively. In  March  1997, it an- 
nounced the acquisition of the Oregon-based U.S. Bancorp (in an $8.8 
billion stock swap), which was greeted favorably by the stock market (the 
stock of both banks rose on the announcement). This marks a new phase 
of westward expansion for First Bank. 
Like First Bank, NationsBank does not maintain a separate charter that 
can be linked to the former operations of MNC. Instead, one has to gauge 
NationsBank’s acquisition success by looking at its general performance. 
NationsBank has been one of the most aggressive acquirers in the country 
(see table 2-18). It has grown through acquisitions from $118 billion in 
assets in 1992 to $186 billion at the end of 1996. As table 2-12 shows, that 
growth has been accompanied by  an unusually high ROE (1 7.95 percent 
in 1996), by a near doubling of its earnings per share, and by an impressive 
efficiency ratio of 56.95 percent. 
NationsBank’s market-to-book ratio in  1993 was  1.56, and it has re- 
mained below other banking system leaders since 1993 (as shown in table 
2- 17). The weakness in NationsBank’s market-to-book value during the 
1990s does not reflect declining profit or operating inefficiency but rather 
its willingness to pay high prices for some of its largest acquisitions. Na- 
tionsBank paid 2.7 times book value (almost 50 percent more than the 
contemporaneous stock price) for Boatmen’s Bank in August 1996 (at a 
time when 2 times book value was the norm for similar acquisitions), and 
in September 1997 NationsBank purchased Barnett Bank for 4 times book 
value. In the first transaction, its stock price declined roughly 8 percent 
when the acquisition was announced, and in  the second case, its stock 
price declined  nearly  6 percent  on the  announcement.  NationsBank’s 
management has defended these purchases and continues to disagree with 
skeptical market analysts in its projected cost savings and revenue growth 
from these acquisitions. In January 1997, for example, one market analyst 
forecasted roughly $50 million dollars less in earnings growth and expense 
reduction for 1997 than NationsBank’s management (Wall Street Journal, 
January  14, 1997, A3). In addition to disagreeing with these forecasts, 
NationsBank has been putting its money where its mouth is: in  1996, it 
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lion shares issued  in the Boatmen’s acquisition), and it announced  and 
followed through on plans to repurchase more than 11 percent of its out- 
standing common stock in 1997. 
Some market analysts agree with NationsBank’s view that these mergers 
will  create more value than they have cost NationsBank’s stockholders. 
The May  10, 1997, Standard and Poor5  Stock Reports issued by  a buy 
recommendation for NationsBank, based in large part on the perceived 
benefits from the Boatmen’s acquisition. In its October 14, 1996, buy rec- 
ommendation, Gerard Klauer Mattison & Co. argued that NationsBank’s 
projections in its acquisition of  Boatmen’s were  achievable for Nations- 
Bank but not for other would-be acquirers that lack its breadth and effi- 
ciency. It based that view largely on the opportunities for improved mar- 
keting and revenue growth from the purchase: 
We  view NB as the most undervalued major bank stock. . . . Without 
question, one of the most controversial mergers in banking history, the 
NB/BOAT deal has many hidden positives. Thus, while many investors 
and other banking observers criticized the deal strongly, we applaud 
it. . . . Boatmen’s is a “linchpin” strategic acquisition for NB. Its geo- 
graphic fit is ideal, adding seven new states and deepening penetration 
in two others. The market shares are mostly very high, and the potential 
for cost cutting and cross-selling is very large. . .  . We  see a strong op- 
portunity for NB to enhance revenues by selling products to the under- 
marketed BOAT customer base (1, 3, 9, 12). 
Firstar’s Acquisitions 
Firstar’s acquisitions in 1995 did not result in the dilution of earnings 
per share or in substandard performance in comparison with other Mid- 
western banks, as shown in table 2-1 3.  While the negative market reaction 
to its expansion strategy resulted in a 9.4 percent stockholder return for 
1994, Firstar’s 1995 stock return was 53.7 percent. Firstar is not as highly 
prized a franchise as First Bank, but its April 1995 market-to-book ratio 
(1.61) still exceeded the nationwide average of 1.55, and its book-to-mar- 
ket ratio rose significantly in 1996, exceeding its value in April 1994 (before 
our two acquisition announcements). 
The  consequences of  Firstar’s  acquisition  of  First  Colonial  can  be 
gauged in greater detail. That acquisition resulted in a tripling of Firstar’s 
Illinois operations during 1995, which is visible in its separately chartered 
Illinois bank. Data on that bank permit an evaluation of  Firstar’s ability 
to reap the cost savings that it had projected. One-time charges in  1995 
raised noninterest expenses for that year, but noninterest expenses relative 
to assets have  subsequently fallen faster than  comparable benchmarks 
(from 3.3 percent of assets at the end of 1994 to 2.9 percent of assets in 
early 1997). 
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tion seems to have resulted in improved efficiency. That conclusion is fur- 
ther supported by  the fact that the decline in expenses did not coincide 
with a reduction in net interest margin (given the production complemen- 
tarity between increases in net interest margin and increases in physical 
expenses). Firstar Illinois’ first-quarter 1997 ROE of  13.2 percent is sig- 
nificantly higher that the 10.8 percent (size-weighted) ROE of the combi- 
nation of Firstar Illinois and First Colonial in 1993. 
The Firstar-First  Colonial merger, however, did result in a decline in 
assets in  1996 and a slight decline in the loan-to-asset ratio. The acquisi- 
tion of First Colonial produced surprising widespread defections of  its 
loan officers, who moved to other banks and took many customers with 
them. Those reactions reflected the reduced autonomy of loan officers fol- 
lowing Firstar’s centralization of control over its acquiree’s loan portfolio. 
Thus, while Firstar is posting a reasonable ROE in comparison with other 
Chicago-land banks and has achieved significant cost savings, it was blind- 
sided by employee morale problems that hampered its revenue growth. 
The Firstar Illinois experience reflects well on Harris Bank’s approach 
to acquisition, which emphasizes preserving acquiree autonomy (at least 
during the initial postacquisition period). Someday Harris may choose to 
consolidate its acquirees (after having cemented customer relationships 
between customers and the parent through up-selling and cross-selling) at 
little cost to its loan portfolio. But the difference in the growth perfor- 
mance of Firstar and Harris acquirees suggests that the preservation of 
local autonomy may be crucial to maintaining postacquisition revenue 
growth. 
Did the negative stock price reaction to Firstar’s expansion strategy in 
1994 reflect  market  anticipation  of  Firstar’s postacquisition  problems? 
Probably not. First, market reaction was negative for both acquisitions, 
while only the First Colonial acquisition resulted in stalled revenue growth. 
Second, it would be hard to argue that the market foresaw a personnel 
problem that the bank itself had not anticipated. It is more plausible that 
the negative reaction of the market to Firstar’s expansion strategy in 1994 
reflected market disappointment that Firstar had not positioned itself to 
be acquired, rather than concerns about Firstar’s ability to achieve cost 
reductions or maintain above-average performance. 
First Chicago-Lake  Shore 
First Chicago is probably the most obvious “suspect” acquirer. In six 
of our nine cases, price reactions were positive for the combined entity. In 
four of those six cases, price reactions were positive for both banks in- 
volved in the merger. The three cases of negative price reactions for com- 
bined entities were the two Firstar cases and First Chicago’s acquisition 
of Lake Shore. While we have argued that Firstar’s stock price decline did 
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the case of First Chicago it is easier to make an argument that the market 
reasonably doubted First Chicago’s ability to create value through an ac- 
quisition. 
In analyzing First Chicago’s performance, it is important to distinguish 
the local banking operations of First Chicago’s parent bank in Chicago 
(First National Bank of Chicago) from the operations of the rest of the 
holding company (which include major profit centers that operate as sepa- 
rate entities, such as its private equity affiliate, its middle-market lender- 
American National Bank-and  its Delaware-based credit card bank). In 
1994, 45  percent  of First Chicago’s net income came from credit card 
banking profits; American National and venture capital profits accounted 
for another 24 percent of holding company net income. While one could 
argue that some gains from the Lake Shore acquisition would show up in 
First Chicago’s nonbank affiliates, the primary gains anticipated from the 
acquisition of Lake Shore entailed retail bank  cost cutting, and thus it 
seems reasonable to ask whether First National Bank of Chicago (FNBC) 
was up to the task of enhancing the efficiency of Lake Shore. 
At the holding company level, First Chicago has seen improvement in 
its market-to-book value over the 199Os, which largely reflected credit card 
profits, private equity earnings, and (in 1995 and 1996) its merger with 
National Bank of Detroit (NBD), which enjoyed a higher market-to-book 
ratio. The volatility of  the holding company’s profits indicates that  the 
sources of holding company profitability have been dissimilar from many 
other banks. Moreover, the data in table 2-14 indicate that First Chicago’s 
banking flagship-FNBC-was  inefficient and unprofitable before the ac- 
quisition of Lake Shore. While First Chicago’s holding company earned a 
1993 ROE of 23 percent before acquisition, FNBC’s ROE was only 11.14 
percent in  that year, and FNBC’s 1992 ROE had been  -17.10  percent. 
FNBC’s efficiency  ratio was extremely poor at 91.7 percent in 1992 and 
72.9 percent in 1993. 
In December 1995, First Chicago entered into a merger of equals with 
National Bank of  Detroit (NBD) in an effort for its management to re- 
main at least partly in control  of  its struggling franchise. Despite high 
ROE and improved efficiency and earnings per share after the FCC-NBD 
merger, FNBC performance has remained lackluster. There is  little evi- 
dence to suggest that FCC’s merger with NBD will lead to efficiency gains 
in First Chicago’s core banking operations. Since 1994, ROE at FNBC 
has remained persistently below those of relevant benchmarks. 
Thus, First Chicago’s performance and consolidation history might be 
seen as evidence that it is  pursuing a survival and acquisition strategy 
that favors managerial independence (and perquisites) over stockholder 
profits. While we do not claim to offer proof of that proposition, the facts 
for this case are at least consistent with many of the claims of the consoli- 
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Comerica-Manufacturers 
The 1992 merger of equals between Comerica and Manufacturers pro- 
duced some one-time expenses in  1992, but subsequent growth and per- 
formance  have  been  good.  Table  2-15  presents  data  for  Comerica- 
Manufacturers  as a combined entity, from the year before the merger 
through  1996. We  compare Comerica-Manufacturers’ performance with 
that of Old Kent Bank, the other major bank holding company operating 
primarily in  Michigan during this period.  Old  Kent  has been  a fast- 
growing and successful bank and has expanded through acquisition and 
de novo branching during the 1990s, both within Michigan and into Indi- 
ana and Illinois. Thus, it does not provide a counterfactual nonconsoli- 
dation benchmark against which to measure the effects of the merger of 
Comerica  and  Manufacturers.  Nevertheless,  the  comparison  with  Old 
Kent is useful for gauging how disruptive the merger of equals has been. 
Some industry analysts are skeptical of the advantages of  such mergers 
because of potential difficulties in integrating management and operations 
that can slow progress and reduce performance. 
Comerica-Manufacturers and Old Kent have had similar experiences 
over the period 1993-1996.  They have grown at similar rates and enjoyed 
similarly high net interest margins, high ROES, and low efficiency ratios. 
The earnings-per-share growth has been  high  in  both franchises. The 
market-to-book ratios of Comerica and Old Kent have been comparable 
over the past few years as well. We  conclude from this comparison that 
the Comerica-Manufacturers merger of equals has successfully avoided po- 
tential problems of integrating management and operations. 
Mercantile-United Postal and Roosevelt-Farm & Home 
The two St. Louis 1994 acquisition cases are best considered together 
(see  table  2- 16),  particularly  because  Mercantile  ended  up  acquiring 
Roosevelt in 1997. Boatmen’s Bank (which was acquired by  NationsBank 
and thus filed no annual report for 1996) appears as a St. Louis banking 
benchmark against which to gauge the performance of these acquisitions. 
Boatmen’s itself is not an ideal nonmerger counterfactual; it has been ac- 
tively  engaged in acquisitions over  the past decade, particularly in the 
Southwest. We  also include the Midwest regional benchmark. 
Before reviewing Roosevelt’s accounts, we  point out that these accounts 
have changed dramatically from one annual report to the next: note the 
difference in reported 1993 ROE from the 1993 income statement (given in 
table 2-9) and the 1993 ROE reported in the 1996 annual report (in table 2- 
16). Given the dramatic changes in the way accounts have been reported, 
we  suggest caution when using the balance sheet and income statement 
data that we  report for Roosevelt in table 2-16. In particular, 1996 ROE 
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regulatory charge (faced by  all thrifts) to recapitalize the thrift deposit 
insurance fund and a payment to terminate certain swap transactions. 
From the perspective of some of our indicators, Roosevelt’s postacqui- 
sition performance during 1995 and 1996 was disappointing when com- 
pared with that of Mercantile and other U.S. banks. As with other thrifts, 
Roosevelt’s net interest margin and fee income have remained low com- 
pared with those of banks. Roosevelt-Farm & Home’s ROE, earnings per 
share, and noninterest income growth all declined after they were com- 
bined. Its stock returns for 1994 and 1995 were 7.7 percent and 33.5 per- 
cent, respectively (a two-year return of 43.8 percent). While in some abso- 
lute sense this two-year return is respectable, compared with other banks 
in our sample it was a bit low. The two-year return for Mercantile over 
1994 and 1995, for example, was 63 percent. Compared with our list of 
acquirers (table 2-17), only Firstar had a comparably low two-year return 
(39.2 percent); two-year returns for other acquirers ranged between 52.7 
percent (NationsBank) and 72.3 percent (FirstBank). 
That is not to say, however, that the acquisition was a failure. Roosevelt 
had seen enormous growth in its market-to-book value before acquisition 
(from 0.48 in April 1991 to 2.24 in April 1993). While its market-to-book 
ratio declined to 1.45 in 1994 and 1995, it rebounded by April 1996.  It is un- 
clear whether the high market-to-book ratio in 1996 reflected greater effi- 
ciency a;t Roosevelt or market expectations of the takeover of Roosevelt 
(which subsequently took place). There is some evidence, however, that 
Roosevelt was beginning to turn the corner on its performance before be- 
ing acquired. Standard and Poor2 Stock Reports (April 23, 1997) noted im- 
provements in net interest margin, in asset quality, and in fee income in the 
first quarter of 1997 and argued that the acquisition price per share of $22 
(nearly $5 higher than the April 1996  price) offered by Mercantile was justi- 
fied, given the 1997 improvements in Roosevelt’s performance. 
Mercantile has been an active acquirer throughout 1995 and 1996, as is 
apparent in table 2-18, and it would be virtually impossible to measure the 
contribution of  United Postal to Mercantile’s performance. Mercantile’s 
many acquisitions (with accompanying transitory merger expenses) also 
make it difficult to gauge the long-term gains from its acquisitions. Never- 
theless, in contrast to Roosevelt’s weak postacquisition performance, Mer- 
cantile has done reasonably well. It has avoided dilution of earnings per 
share since the acquisition, has maintained above-average ROE and effi- 
ciency in 1994 and 1995 (relative to the Midwest benchmark), and has kept 
pace with Boatmen’s Bank during those years. Its unusually high growth 
in assets of 19.4 percent in  1996, due to several acquisitions (table 2-18), 
produced some one-time noninterest expenses that depressed 1996 ROE, 
but  long-run  indicators  of  performance  unrelated  to  these  one-time 
charges (net interest margin, loans-to-assets, and noninterest income) all 
remain  strong. Mercantile’s market-to-book  value remained  high from 
1992 to 1996. Table 2-18  Mergers and Acquisitions, 199C1997 





















(con  tinued) 
Libertyville Savings and Loan 
Frankfort Bankshares, Inc. 
Northern Cities Bancorporation, Inc. 
Sionxland Bank Holding Company 
Western Capital Investment Corp. 
Bank Shares Incorporated 
Colorado National Bankshares 
Republic Acceptance Corporation 
American Bancshares of Mankato 
Bank of Park Forest 
First Western Bank of St. Louis 
Park 
State Bank of Elkhorn 
Bank of Iowa, Inc. 
Northwestern State Bank 
First National Bank of Geneva 




Bank of Athens 


























First Financial Investors, Inc. 
United Bank of Bismarck 
Green Mountain Corporation, Inc. 
Metropolitan Financial Corporation 
First Western Corporation 
First Bank of  Omaha 
Southwest Bank 
FirsTier Financial 
US.  Bancorp 
Harvest Financial Corporation Table 2-18  (continued) 
Pretransaction Acquisitions  Transaction  Posttransaction Acquisitions 
First Chicago 
9/90  Purchase from RTC  7/8/94  Lake Shore Bancorp 
91  Purchase from RTC 
9/28/90  Empire FSB of America  61 1  8/92  Manufacturers National 
1/14/91  Plaza Commerce Bancorp  Corporation 
71319 1  InBancshares 
11/91 
Comericu 
Midlantic National Bank & Trust Co. 
NutionsBunk 
2/1/93  Chrysler First Inc.  loll193  MNC Financial Inc. 
























Barrington Bancorp. Inc. 
Fortune Financial 
Hibernia National Bank of Texas 
Sugar Creek National Bank 
Nasher Financial Corporation 
NorthPark National Corporation 
Fidelity National Bank 
Pacific Western Bancshares 
Lockwood Banc Group, Inc. 
University Bank & Trust Company 
W.Y. Campbell & Company 
Professional Life Underwriters 
Services 
QuestStar Bank, N.A. 
Metrobank California 
U.S. WEST Financial Services Inc. 
Consolidated Bank, N.A. 
RHNB Corporation 
Corpus Christi NationalBank 
Intercontinental Bank 
North Florida Bank Corporation 
Bank South Corporation 31 19/90 















Home Federal Savings 
Hannibal Mutual Loan and Building 
Conservative Bank 
First Granite Savings and Loan 
First Nationwide Bank of San 
Francisco 
Home Savings of America 
Home Federal Bancorp of  Missouri, 
Inc. 
Old National Bancshares, Inc. 
Ameribanc, Inc. 
American Bank of St. Louis 
American Bank of Franklin County 
MidAmerican Corporation 
Johnson County Bankshares, Inc. 
First National Bank of Flora 
Mt. Vernon Bancorp, Inc. 
Metro Bancorporation 
Roosevelt Financial Group 
6130194  Farm & Home 
Financial Corporation 
Mercantile Bancorporation 






















CSF Holdings, Inc. 
Sun World, N.A. 
Charter Bancshares Inc. 
Boatmen’s Bancshares, Inc 
Barnett Bank (announced) 
WSB Bancorp Inc. 
Kirksville Bancshares, Inc. 
RFG taken over by Mercantile 
Banc. 
UNSL Financial Corporation 
Wedge Bank 
Central Mortgage Bancshares, Inc. 
TCBankshares, Inc. 
Plains Spirit Financial Corporation 
Southwest Bancshares, Inc. 
Hawkeye Bancorporation 
First Sterling Bancorp 
Security Bank of Conway 
Metro Savings Bank 
Mark Twain Bancshares 
Roosevelt Financial Group 
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While Roosevelt’s postacquisition  performance  was  somewhat disap- 
pointing, its acquisition by a successful acquirer in 1997 (Mercantile) illus- 
trates why  the efficiency of bank mergers must be judged in a dynamic 
context. Inevitably, some mergers will be less successful than others. The 
important  question  for economic  efficiency  is not  what  proportion  of 
mergers are successful, but rather whether unsuccessful franchises (includ- 
ing those that result from previous mergers) are quickly identified and 
absorbed by  successful institutions. One lesson of our St. Louis cases is 
the speed with which a disappointing merger can turn an acquirer into a 
target. 
3  Conclusion 
What have we learned from our case studies of bank consolidation dur- 
ing the 1990s? What do our cases have to say about the efficiency of the 
recent bank consolidation wave, and what lessons do they offer for future 
empirical work? 
Four lessons about the recent wave  of bank consolidation  should be 
stressed. First, our nine cases largely support the view that bank mergers 
in the 1990s have created value. For the most part (with the exception of 
First Chicago and possibly Roosevelt), acquirers seem to have achieved 
gains that they claimed they could achieve ex ante. In the case of Roose- 
velt, a weak acquirer rapidly became the target of a successful acquirer. 
First Chicago’s use of consolidation as a tool to retain managerial inde- 
pendence (possibly at the expense of stockholders) is the exception rather 
than the rule. 
Second,  not  all  the  remaining  mergers  were  pure  success  stories. 
Firstar’s acquisition of First Colonial achieved the gains that it expected, 
but it suffered from losses in revenue growth due to the unexpected defec- 
tion of loan officers. The lesson of that merger is that the single-minded 
pursuit of physical cost savings may be an inadequate strategy. A bank’s 
resources are almost entirely its staff; successful relationship banking de- 
pends on the careful management of the bank’s human resources. 
Third, while First Chicago’s case illustrates that managerial incentives 
may still limit efficiency gains for some mergers, the behavior of the man- 
agement of our targets (notably those of Boulevard and Lake Shore) illus- 
trates how competition has changed managerial incentives in the 1990s. 
In the case of Boulevard, highly inefficient, previously entrenched manage- 
ment surrendered the franchise in the face of increased competition. In 
the case of  Lake Shore, the new CEO’s first action was to convince his 
board of directors that the value-maximizing strategy for the bank was to 
put itself on the market. 
Fourth, our study of  Harris’s acquisition  of Suburban illustrates that 
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is, even mergers that offer no opportunities for cost savings can lead to 
significant improvements by means of cross-selling and up-selling to boost 
loan growth, net interest margin, and fee income. 
Our case studies offer three additional lessons from a methodological 
standpoint. First, stock price reactions to consolidation announcements 
(which tended to be positive for combined entities in our cases) do not 
offer a reliable guide to expected or actual productivity gains from consoli- 
dations. In our two Firstar cases, cost-saving acquisitions undertaken by 
a bank with a track record of successful similar acquisitions were greeted 
with negative stock price reactions. As we have argued, those reactions are 
better viewed as market disappointment that Firstar itself was not placed 
on the market rather than as market skepticism over value creation from 
acquisition. 
Not only do stock price reactions have multiple interpretations; in a rap- 
idly changing environment, the profitability estimates that underlie market 
reactions are much more prone to error. The strong positive reaction to 
Roosevelt’s acquisition of Farm & Home, for example, and the rapid ap- 
preciation of  Roosevelt’s stock in the year before the merger announce- 
ment were followed by  somewhat disappointing postmerger performance. 
NationsBank’s open disagreement with some market analysts in the past 
two years (and its aggressive stock repurchase program) illustrates the po- 
tential for significant disagreement in the midst of dramatic change. 
A second methodological lesson for empirical studies of the productiv- 
ity gains from mergers is that they should focus on the dynamics of the 
consolidation process, rather than add up the numbers of failed and suc- 
cessful mergers that occur. If disappointing mergers are quickly corrected 
by  subsequent transactions (as in the case of Roosevelt-Farm  & Home), 
empirical work that focuses on the relative frequency of failed and success- 
ful mergers may substantially overstate the costs of consolidation and thus 
understate the net long-run productivity benefits from such transactions. 
A final methodological lesson from our cases is the practical difficulty 
of constructing useful nonconsolidation benchmarks for panel data anal- 
ysis  of the gains from consolidation. In our critique of existing empiri- 
cal work in section 1, we  argued that there were many potential pitfalls in 
constructing counterfactual benchmarks to measure the gains from con- 
solidation. In our case analyses, some of those pitfalls became apparent. 
Should postmerger performance be analyzed at the level of the holding 
company or the chartered bank? Should the comparison be restricted to 
the local acquired bank  or to the wider  franchise, which may  operate 
throughout a state or across state lines? How does one perform compari- 
sons when some banks choose to consolidate bank charters within states 
and across states lines (such as NationsBank and First Bank), while others 
(such as Harris) choose not to do so? How can one isolate the effects of 
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the size of one-time (as opposed to permanent) costs is unclear, and where 
the time-lag of implementing cost savings may be several years? 
We  hope that future microeconometric  work will worry more about 
these questions. Future work should also follow Jayaratne and Strahan’s 
(1997) example of broadening the measurement of  efficiency changes in 
banking  to encompass  consumers’ gains  from  increasing  competition, 
which may lower bank profitability in the midst  of deregulation. In the 
meantime, the overarching lesson from our cases is that when gauging the 
productivity gains from bank consolidation, one should attach less weight 
to panel studies of stock price reactions or postmerger performance and 
more weight to the relatively sanguine cross-regime studies of the benefits 
of consolidation. 
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Comment  Christopher James 
Introduction 
The academic literature on the value gains from bank mergers creates a 
troubling paradox. Empirical studies examining the stock market reaction 
to merger announcements and the performance of banks after acquisi- 
tions find, on average, no significant gain in value or improved operating 
performance. On average the empirical evidence indicates that acquired 
firms gain at the expense of the acquiring firm. Moreover, there appears 
to be little in the way of improved operating performance for the merged 
firms relative to industry peers following the acquisition. However, despite 
any apparent value gains, mergers in banking continue at a rapid pace. The 
lack of econometrics evidence of efficiency gains is even more troubling in 
light of the fact that an important impetus for consolidation  has been 
the removal of geographic and product market entry restrictions that are 
generally believed to impede operating efficiency and bank profitability. 
The paper by Calomiris and Karceski attempts to reconcile these con- 
flicting facts through an in-depth analysis of nine bank mergers in the 
1990s. Case studies, the authors argue, can uncover value gains that are 
difficult to estimate and identify using standard large sample econometrics 
tools. Specifically, they argue that average measured gains from mergers- 
whether  measured  by  stock  price  reactions  or performance  improve- 
ments-are  not reliable measures of the true gains from acquisitions. Part 
of the problem lies in the data used in large sample studies. For example, 
ex  post  performance gains are often measured using  accounting data. 
However, accounting measures of  performance may not capture the eco- 
nomic gains from mergers. Moreover, mergers often involve restructuring 
costs that can mask operating gains that may take a considerable amount 
of time to be achieved. 
An alternative measure of performance is the stock returns of the bidder 
and target around the time the acquisition is announced. The change in 
the combined market value of the acquired and acquiring bank, the argu- 
ment goes, provides a measure of the expected gains from the acquisition. 
However, studies using stock returns have their own set of problems. Im- 
portant among them is that stock returns only measure the value of new 
information revealed at the time the merger is announced. However, to the 
extent that the merger is anticipated, the stock price reaction to the merger 
will  provide  a downward  biased  estimate  of  the value created  (or de- 
stroyed) by the acquisition. 
A second reason large sample studies may fail to identify value gains is 
that there may be important cross-sectional differences in  the source of 
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merger gains that are difficult to identify or estimate using standard econo- 
metric tools. Specifically, the literature suggests that the motives for bank 
mergers are quite varied-ranging  from cost savings to revenue enhance- 
ment to so-called managerial hubris. Failure to condition on these differ- 
ences may lead to average measures of performance providing unreliable 
measures of the actual gains from acquisitions. 
Given these problems with large sample studies, Calomiris and Kar- 
ceski argue that to understand the gains from mergers requires a case-by- 
case analysis. Their goal is to document that the source of merger gains 
varies cross sectionally and through time. Moreover, they argue that, by 
conditioning on the motive for the merger and by examining performance 
changes in the context of the different motives, the real efficiency effects 
of the merger wave of the 1990s can be uncovered. 
While I am extremely sympathetic to a case study approach, the lessons 
learned from the authors’ nine case studies are quite limited. As I discuss 
below, the primary benefit of case studies is their ability to reconcile the 
contradictory finding of  large sample empirical studies. Are the perfor- 
mance measures used misleading or are the real efficiency gains simply 
not there? In particular, the goal should be to explain why, in the face of 
what the authors believe to be significant efficiency gains from mergers, 
large sample studies provide such weak evidence of efficiency gains. The 
challenge here is to structure clinical studies in a way  that allows the re- 
searcher to go from the specific to the general (or at least learn more about 
the shortcomings of  large sample studies). For example, clinical studies 
have the potential to identify conditioning variables that can be used in 
large sample studies to sort mergers based on their motivation and likely 
sources of gains. Alternatively, clinical studies may permit us to better un- 
derstand the timing of performance gains from acquisitions and the cir- 
cumstance in which accounting measures of performance are misleading. 
In my  discussion I focus on why  the large sample empirical studies fail 
to find significant value gains from mergers. I also discuss how clinical 
studies might be used to provide evidence to improve large sample econo- 
metric studies. Finally I discuss some of  the lessons that can be  learned 
from the cases Calomiris and Karceski study. 
Measuring the Gains from Bank Acquisitions 
Academic studies of merger-related gains in banking follow one of two 
approaches. The first approach compares accounting performance of the 
merged banks to a benchmark of either premerger performance or a group 
of comparable banks that were not involved in merger activity. In these 
studies, mergers are assumed to result in improved performance if the post- 
merger performance of the combined banks exceeds the performance of 
either comparable banks or the pro forma performance of  the merging 
banks before the merger. Studies based on accounting data focus on three 164  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
measures of performance: operating income, cash flows, and operating 
costs. 
The second approach to analyzing merger gains examines the stock 
price performance of the bidder and the target firm around the announce- 
ment of an acquisition, A merger is assumed to be value enhancing if the 
combined value of the bidder and the target increase following the merger 
announcement.  However, with  the  exception  of  several recent  papers, 
most studies examine the abnormal returns of the bidder and the target 
separately, making an assessment of the overall gains from the acquisi- 
tion difficult. 
What do these studies show? Looking first at the studies that examine 
stock returns, there is little evidence that  mergers are value enhancing. 
Specifically, all studies find a significant increase in the value of the target 
(on the order of 15 percent in the two days around the merger announce- 
ment) and most find a decrease in the value of the bidder  (of about 2 
percent). Since the acquiring banks are on average significantly larger than 
the acquired bank, the combined value of the bidder and target declines 
slightly on the announcement of the merger. Overall the studies based on 
stock returns suggest no increase in value resulting from the merger.' 
As Calomiris and  Karceski point  out, there are several reasons why 
measures of gains based on stock returns may be flawed. First, merger 
announcements  mix  information  concerning the  proposed  acquisition 
with information concerning the financing of the acquisition. Since most 
bank acquisitions are financed with stock and since stock issues are, in 
general, associated with a negative stock price  reaction  for issuers, the 
returns to bidding firms may understate value gains anticipated from the 
merger, Consistent with this view Houston and Ryngaert (1997) find that 
the returns to bidders are significantly greater in mergers financed with 
cash or debt than in mergers financed with stock. However, even for cash 
offers, bidders continue to earn negative abnormal returns, suggesting that 
the adverse consequences of using stock to finance the acquisition do not 
offset positive returns to bidders associated with acquisitions. 
A second reason abnormal return studies may not accurately reflect the 
value gains is that acquisitions are largely anticipated so that the positive 
effects on bank value do not show themselves on the announcement date. 
This problem may be particularly important for bank acquisitions in the 
late 1980s and the 1990s because many banks clearly expressed a strategy 
to grow through acquisitions. It seems unlikely, however, that the negative 
stock price performance of bidding firms can be explained by the acquisi- 
tion being anticipated. Pre-announcement leakage is likely to attenuate 
the announcement  day returns  but not change what would be positive 
1. See for example Houston and Ryngaert (1994), Cornett and De (1991), James and Wier 
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returns to bidders into negative announcement day returns. Pre-announce- 
ment leakage may  also effect target returns  since there is  considerable 
speculation concerning potential targets prior to an acquisition. This at- 
tenuation bias together with the attenuation of bidder returns may result 
in positive though insignificant abnormal returns for the combined banks 
on the announcement day. Unfortunately this issue has not been addressed 
in the literature.2  This may be a fruitful area for future research where the 
results of clinical studies may be particularly helpful. 
A final problem with event studies is that the negative stock market 
reaction of bidding firms may reflect disappointment with the announced 
transaction  because it conveys information that the bidding firm is less 
likely to be acquired in the future. This clearly has been a factor in several 
acquisitions (most notably the recent acquisition by  SunTrust of Crestar 
Financial Corporation, which led to a decline of about 10 percent in the 
value of SunTrust shares). However, it is unlikely that the market’s disap- 
pointment  with a few potential targets’ becoming acquirers can explain 
the negative average returns to bidding firms. 
Overall it seems unlikely that these problems are important enough to 
mask a significant increase in the average value of acquired and acquiring 
firms resulting from mergers. However, this conclusion does not imply that 
efficiency gains are limited or that a number of acquisitions may not create 
value for bank shareholders. As Calomiris and Karceski point out, effi- 
ciency gains from acquisitions may accrue to bank customers in a compet- 
itive market. If this is the case, then the small positive return to the com- 
bined entity may simply reflect the fact that the bank captures only a small 
fraction of the gains. More important, cross-sectional studies of the abnor- 
mal returns from acquisitions reveal significant differences in  the com- 
bined returns to bidders and targets across mergers. For example, Houston 
and Ryngaert (1994) find the value weighted returns to bidder and target 
is increasing in the degree of market overlap between the acquired and the 
acquiring banks, the percentage of the acquisition financed with cash or 
conditional stock, and the profitability of the bidder prior to the acquisi- 
ti~n.~  In a recent paper, DeLong (1998) finds that a positive and statisti- 
cally significant return for mergers involves both geographic focus (where 
acquiring and acquired bank are headquartered  in  the same state) and 
activity focus (where the stock returns of the acquired and acquiring firms 
2. Several studies attempt to control for this by measuring the abnormal returns of target 
firms from the date it is announced that a bank is a potential target (see, e.g., Houston and 
Ryngaert 1994). Controlling for pre-announcement leakage, the combined value gain of the 
bidder and target is not significantly different from zero. 
3. Conditional stock offers involve financing the acquisition with common stock, but mak- 
ing the number of shares issued a function of the future price of the bidder’s stock. Condi- 
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are highly correlated in the twelve months preceding the merger). In con- 
trast, DeLong finds that diversifying mergers destroy value. 
The cross-sectional variation in  abnormal returns suggests that there 
may be a number of “good” acquisitions (at least from the standpoint of 
bank shareholders). For example, the fact that returns are increasing in 
the degree of market overlap suggests that mergers involving cost savings 
or the creation of market power add value for shareholders. Unfortunately, 
without detailed information concerning the anticipated gains from the 
merger, it is impossible to distinguish between these two alternatives. 
Given the inability of  stock price  performance  studies to determine 
whether mergers create real economic value and the sources of such value 
gains, researchers have turned to examining postmerger performance us- 
ing accounting data.4 However, studies of postmerger performance also 
provide weak evidence of an overall improvement in performance. For ex- 
ample, Cornett and Tehranian (1992) find a small but significant increase in 
postmerger operating cash flows compared with the performance of banks 
not engaged in merger activity. However, their results appear to be sensi- 
tive to the banks used as a benchmark. Specifically, Cornett and Tehran- 
ian use as a benchmark a group of publicly traded banks that did not 
engage in any merger activity during the comparison period. However as 
Pilloff (1996) points out, a more appropriate  benchmark is the perfor- 
mance of banks that are located in the same region as the merging banks. 
Accounting for regional differences in performance, Pilloff finds no sig- 
nificant improvement in operating performance. 
Methodological problems may partly explain why performance studies 
provide little evidence of performance gains. The most important among 
these is the difficulty in constructing a good benchmark and the timing of 
performance gains. As Calomiris and Karceski point out, there is selectiv- 
ity bias in the sample of comparable banks. Banks that do not merge may 
be doing so for good reason. For example nonmerging banks may have 
chosen internal growth or may have been involved in prior merger activity. 
The problem of finding a suitable benchmark is particularly important in 
banking during the last decade precisely because the industry was involved 
in a merger wave. 
Even if  mergers result in improvements in performance, the lags be- 
tween the completion of mergers and the realization of operating improve- 
ments may be long and varied. Moreover, restructuring and consolidation 
costs may lead to a deterioration in short-term performance even though 
long-term performance is expected to improve. This problem is particu- 
larly important if there is cross-sectional variation of the source of merger 
gains. For example, mergers motivated by  anticipated cost savings may 
result in faster improvements in operating performance than mergers mo- 
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tivated by revenue synergies or diversification opportunities. This fact may 
lead to a significant understatement in the gains (or losses) arising from 
mergers. 
Consistent with the results from stock price studies, performance stud- 
ies suggest that there is considerable cross-sectional variation in the per- 
formance of merged banks. For example, Pilloff (1996) finds that low tar- 
get profitability and high target and bidder expenses are correlated with 
subsequent performance improvements. Pilloff also finds, however,  that 
although both performance changes and abnormal returns are related to 
premerger expenses and operating performance, the significant variables 
differ between the two measures. For example, performance gains are re- 
lated to high target and bidder expenses, while abnormal returns are re- 
lated to the difference between bidder and target expense measures. More 
troubling, variables that explain cross-sectional differences in abnormal 
returns-such  as the mode of financing or the degree of market overlap- 
do not explain cross-sectional differences in postmerger performance. In 
addition, there is no consistent evidence that abnormal returns are sig- 
nificantly related to postmerger performance. 
What can we  conclude from the studies of merger gain? First, the gains 
from mergers appear to be significantly related to the motive behind the 
merger. Specifically, mergers motivated by cost savings appear to generate 
greater gains to bank  shareholders than mergers motivated by  revenue 
enhancement or diversification benefits. The failure of performance-based 
studies to provide confirming evidence on the importance of cost savings 
may  arise from differences across mergers in the timing of cost savings. 
Second, gains to shareholders appear to be significantly related to how 
the merger is financed, suggesting that abnormal stock returns may not 
provide an accurate measure of the value gains associated with the merger. 
Finally, there appears to be significant variation in the pricing of  deals 
and the motive for mergers over time. For example, Houston and Ryngaert 
(1994) provide some evidence of an improvement in bidder returns and an 
increase in the overall gains from acquisitions in the 1990s. For example, 
they find that the combined returns to bidders and targets since 1989 are 
positive. In contrast, the combined returns were negative in the 1980s. 
Additional  evidence, consistent with an improvement in  the returns 
from mergers comes from an analysis of deal pricing in the  1980s and 
1990s. For example, table 3C.1 provides summary statistics for large bank 
acquisitions (where the acquired bank has over $250 million in market 
value in  1982 constant dollars) during the period  1982-97.  Notice that 
since 1992 there has been a decline in the premium paid over market for 
the acquired firm. Moreover, recent mergers are much less dilutive of earn- 
ings than mergers in the 1980s. Finally, notice that the percentage of over- 
head reduction needed for the deal to break even (in terms of being non- 
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1980s. Whether the improvement in deal pricing is a result of an improve- 
ment in  the market for corporate control in banking (as Calomiris and 
Karceski argue) or a change in the motivation for mergers (cost reduction 
versus revenue enhancement) is an issue that deserves further research. 
What Can Be Learned from Case Studies? 
As discussed earlier, the primary benefit of case studies of bank mergers 
is to better our understanding of the source of merger gains (or losses) so 
as to resolve the conflicting results of large sample empirical studies. The 
case studies presented by Calomiris and Karceski assist us in understand- 
ing how  acquisitions might add value. In particular, the main finding of 
their paper is that the motives for mergers in banking are quite varied. As 
a result, failure to condition on the motive for the acquisition may obscure 
performance improvements arising from the acquisition. Unfortunately 
the nine case studies do not enable us to go from the specific to the gen- 
eral. In particular, they do not identify new easily quantifiable condition- 
ing variables that can be used in large sample studies to empirically test 
whether mergers add value. As a result, the conclusions one can draw from 
the nine case studies are similar to the conclusions one can draw from the 
large sample studies: certain types of acquisitions are more likely to gener- 
ate value gains than others. 
The next step in this area should be to undertake an in-depth analysis 
of a larger number of acquisitions and then use the results to test whether 
refined measures of the reason for the merger and a better understanding 
of the timing of performance changes can resolve the conflicting results 
of abnormal stock returns and performance studies. In this regard, analyst 
research reports on the anticipated gains from mergers and their forecasts 
of cost savings and revenue gains may be particularly useful. In a project 
currently underway, Joel Houston, Mike Ryngaert, and I use analyst re- 
search reports obtained through INVESTEXT together with bank annual 
reports and news releases to sort mergers based on what analysts believe 
to be the motive for the merger and the likely source of value gain (or in 
some cases value loss). These reports also provide a detailed description 
of  the  anticipated  timing  of  performance  changes resulting from  the 
merger (in many cases by expense and revenue item). This examination al- 
lows us to then condition the analysis of actual performance on the stated 
motive for the merger and the anticipated changes in performance at the 
time of the merger. 
Structuring clinical analysis in this way allows one to go from the spe- 
cific to the general. In particular, we  use our clinical studies to identify 
conditioning variables that can be used in large sample studies to sort 
mergers based on their motivation and likely sources of gains. Moreover, 
we  are able to assess whether the failure of large sample performance stud- 
ies to identify merger gains results from the failure to control for timing 170  Charles W.  Calomiris and Jason Karceski 
differences among mergers, inappropriate classification of mergers by ob- 
jective, or simply because these acquisitions have no significant effect on 
performance. 
In addition to permitting a more refined classification of the anticipated 
source of merger-related gains, many of the analyst research reports pro- 
vide detailed valuations of the anticipated merger gains. These valuations 
in turn can be related to the premium paid by the acquiring bank to evalu- 
ate the circumstances in which bidders appear to overpay. The difference 
between the premium paid and the value of merger-related gains can be 
compared to the abnormal stock price performance of the bidder to assess 
whether bidder returns are related to the degree of overpayment. 
Our preliminary analysis indicates that analysts classify mergers into 
four categories: (1) cost savings arising from shared overhead expenses, 
(2) revenue enhancement from cross selling, (3) diversification, and (4) 
managerial entrenchment (mergers as an antitakeover device). Analyst as- 
sessments of  the gains from acquisitions appear to be closely related to 
motive for the acquisition and the degree to which the merger is expected 
to be dilutive of earnings per share. Specifically, anticipated value gains 
are greatest for intramarket mergers where anticipated expense reductions 
are greatest. Moreover, these acquisitions tend to be the least dilutive, with 
earnings accretion expected within eighteen months. These acquisitions 
are also expected to generate the greatest earnings improvements (through 
both expense reduction and increases in revenue arising from cross-selling 
opportunities). We also find evidence of significant changes in deal pricing 
and the nature of acquisition in the 1990s. For example, we find a signifi- 
cant decline in the earnings-per-share dilution and in the percent of over- 
head reduction needed to recover the merger premium for acquisitions in 
the 1990s. In addition, the frequency of  “in market” mergers increased in 
the 1990s (partly as a result of the completion of regional and interstate 
banking pacts in the late 1980s). 
Conclusion 
Over the past fifteen years, there has been a dramatic consolidation in 
the US. banking system. A combination of deregulation,  globalization, 
and changing technology has induced a large number of bank mergers 
over this time period. Not surprisingly, this widespread consolidation has 
been the impetus for a large number of academic studies. While this litera- 
ture has provided a number of insights, a number of important questions 
concerning both the motivation for bank mergers and the estimated value 
added from these mergers remain unanswered. 
In many respects, because of the lack of detailed data, the existing litera- 
ture has had a difficult time classifying the motivation  for mergers and 
estimating the ex ante and ex post gains from bank mergers. Case studies 
provide important insights into merger-related gains. The challenge, how- Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990s Efficient?  171 
ever, is to structure the case studies in a way that bridges the gap between 
individual case studies and the existing large sample studies. In this regard, 
the study by Calomiris and Karceski is an important first step. 
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Comment  Anil K Kashyap 
Charles Calomiris and Jason Karceski are to be congratulated for bringing 
some new evidence to the debate over the fallout from bank mergers. As 
they stress in their paper, there is  little consensus in the literature over 
the impact of mergers on operating efficiency, profitability, or shareholder 
wealth. Given this state of affairs I expect that most researchers interested 
in banking will find the paper valuable and well worth reading. 
In my  comments, I try to accomplish three things. First, because the 
paper contains a wealth of data and a number of interesting conjectures 
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about the direction of the industry, I start by laying out what I see as the 
main arguments of the paper. While I am sympathetic to many of the au- 
thors’ claims, there are a couple of areas where I disagree. In the second part 
of my review I identify these points. Finally, I step back and offer some 
thoughts on how case studies can be used  along with more traditional 
types of research. To keep things concrete these suggestions are couched 
in terms of the paper, but I hope it is clear how these principles could be 
applied to any research-oriented case work. 
The Core of the Argument 
As mentioned above, the motivation for this paper is the observation 
that, using conventional research techniques, it is hard  to find evidence 
that mergers cut costs or raise shareholder value. I share the concern of 
Calomiris and Karceski that this result is troubling in light of the massive 
amount of consolidation  that has taken place and the widespread view 
among practitioners that mergers are beneficial. 
The authors argue that this tension is even worse than is commonly 
thought because there is another line of research to support the practi- 
tioners’ view.  Specifically, they point  to the literature that looks at the 
efficiency of banks across regimes. These studies look both at cross-state 
evidence from the United States and comparisons of different countries. 
Calomiris and Karceski read the results as showing that consolidation is 
useful if  it  helps banks expand their diversification either through en- 
hanced branching or expanded product lines. I suspect that skeptics will 
doubt the cross-country studies because they are not ceteris paribus com- 
parisons. But the domestic evidence, particularly the comparison of the 
fate of banks headquartered in North Carolina and Illinois, seems harder 
to dismiss. Thus, I am inclined to agree with their  contention that the 
cross-regime research suggests that there are likely to be gains from con- 
solidation. 
Against this backdrop, the authors tackle the obvious question of why 
conventional merger analysis provides such weak evidence regarding the 
gains from consolidation. They offer separate explanations for why stock 
price reaction studies and postmerger performance analyses might not ac- 
curately capture the gains from mergers. I review some of the details of 
their arguments below, but I believe it is fair to summarize their view as 
saying that mergers are complicated transactions in several important re- 
spects. In particular, they are difficult to analyze because they are taking 
place throughout the banking industry, during a period when the funda- 
mental business of banking may be changing, and (perhaps as a result) 
individual organizations may have very different motivations for under- 
taking mergers. Because of these factors, Calomiris and Karceski believe 
that correctly executing any econometric work is very challenging. 
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of the whole industry, one theme they repeatedly stress is that data from 
the 1980s may not be a reliable guide about what to expect regarding later 
mergers. Given this view it is natural to look for data on the most recent 
mergers to see if  it tells a different story than past studies. Moreover, the 
objections they raise about conventional work lead them to adopt a case 
study approach.  Implicitly this strategy presumes that by  carefully and 
thoroughly looking over a small number of representative cases, a clear 
set of patterns should emerge. 
The paper’s main conclusion is that seven of the nine mergers they ana- 
lyze are clear success stories. In these seven cases, Calomiris and Karceski 
argue that the acquiring banks seem to have accomplished their (publicly) 
stated goals. Importantly, two of the seven ex post successful mergers were 
subject to negative stock price reactions at the time they were announced. 
Another one of these successful cases (Harris and Suburban) involved a 
combination of two banks that were not trying to cut costs but were seek- 
ing to boost revenue through cross selling. Turning to the two less success- 
ful cases, the authors find that  one (involving First Chicago and Lake 
Shore Bancorp) might be well described as reflecting a preference for man- 
agerial gains at the expense of shareholders. The other unsuccessful case 
is  complicated by  the fact that the acquiring institution was itself soon 
taken over. 
Calomiris and Karceski also offer some observations on the lessons they 
believe their work offers for traditional econometric analysis. They begin 
this discussion by  saying “that stock price reactions to consolidation an- 
nouncements (which tended to be positive for combined entities in our 
cases) do not offer a reliable guide to expected or actual productivity gains 
from consolidation.” Next, the authors point to the importance of consid- 
ering the dynamics of the consolidation process, whereby a poor acquisi- 
tion may be unwound in a subsequent transaction. Finally, they highlight 
the difficulty of getting a control sample that can be used as a benchmark 
for gauging the impact of mergers. 
Disagreements 
On the most important point of their paper-that  most of the mergers 
in  their sample were  successful-I  agree with Calomiris and  Karceski. 
However, my  process for reaching this conclusion differs slightly from 
theirs and I also have a somewhat different vision than they do about how 
to build on the case research in this paper. I begin by explaining my inter- 
pretation of their results and then trace that reasoning through to draw 
lessons for further work. 
I agree with the authors’ conclusion that the postmerger performance 
analysis using only publicly available data is very difficult to conduct. As 
they emphasize, most organizations in this industry have been in a nearly 
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transaction can be quite difficult. On the other hand, as I explain below, I 
am much more confident that the stock market reaction provides a reason- 
able measure of the deals that they are analyzing. Therefore, I believe that 
in assessing these deals we  should put much more weight on the stock 
market reactions than on the postmerger performance. 
Judging by the simple metric of what happened to adjusted returns, six 
of the nine deals in this paper were desirable. But, as Calomiris and Kar- 
ceski convincingly argue, there can be problems with the event studies. I 
find three of the objections they highlight to be potentially serious. A first 
potential problem is that the stock market value of a combined entity may 
drop because consumers (rather than the shareholders) capture the gains 
from the merger. A second serious problem is that in a merger wave similar 
to what we have seen in the U.S. banking industry, it is hard to construct 
a reasonable benchmark portfolio. Finally, the market reaction might be 
unfavorable because even though a merger is expected to lower costs or 
raise revenues, the merger undertaken may not be the best option for a 
bank to pursue. Let’s consider whether each of these complicating consid- 
erations might  be important  for the nine cases analyzed  by  Calomiris 
and Karceski. 
The possibility that consumers  rather than shareholders gain from a 
transaction is interesting, but we have no particular reason to believe that 
this possibility is important in these cases. Moreover, if  consumers are 
benefiting from a merger, that means that the shareholder gains would 
understate the overall efficiency gains from the transactions. Since most 
of the stock market responses are already favorable, any unmeasured gains 
to consumers  would  only  strengthen the presumption  that these  were 
mostly good deals. For the stock market signals to be a misleading indica- 
tor of overall efficiency, one must fear that the mergers permit banks to 
exercise market power in an untoward fashion. Given the characteristics 
of the organizations and banking markets involved in these cases, we have 
also no indication that this is a problem. So for these nine cases I see no 
reason to believe that the market reactions are significantly affected by 
these possibilities. 
The potential biases created because of the lack of suitable benchmark 
banks to use for comparisons are more problematic. On the one hand, if 
the best organizations decide that consolidation is the only way to survive, 
while the industry laggards avoid being taken over and eventually fail, 
then merging banks will appear to outperform their peers. On the other 
hand, if there are different long-run strategies that are viable, so that only 
the best banks steer clear of mergers and pursue different options, then 
merging institutions will appear to underperform. 
The cases in this paper  suggest that management entrenchment may 
make things even more complicated. For instance, Boulevard was a poorly 
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before First Bank acquired it. As Gorton and Rosen (1995) persuasively 
argue, such entrenchment is more likely in banking than in other indus- 
tries. If the Boulevard pattern is at all typical, then there will be periods 
when the sample of nonmerging firms will  be dragged  down by  banks 
that ought to be acquired. However, once the acquisition occurs, a quick 
turnaround may be difficult so that it would be hard to determine the full 
impact of entrenchment on the comparison of merging and nonmerging 
institutions. 
All these possibilities lead me to agree with Calomiris and Karceski that 
finding comparable benchmarks is not an easy task. Nevertheless, I believe 
that the benchmark nonmerging institutions that they have assembled are 
fairly representative. For the nine mergers, therefore, the benchmarking 
concerns do not lead me to doubt the basic stock market reports. 
Finally, we must consider what to make of situations where the market 
assessment is negative because a merger announcement signals that other 
options are being forsaken. Since I agree with the authors’ assessment that 
this is a plausible explanation for the Firstar market reactions, settling this 
issue is important. To this end, it may be helpful to rephrase the question 
to ask how we  should interpret a situation where the market prices reflect 
the sentiment that management has simply made a suboptimal decision. 
One view is that the decision is reversible (because the merger can be 
cancelled or the acquired bank can later be spun off), so that investors 
with a long horizon may not see any wealth destroyed. By this logic one 
might favor waiting to see the impact on operating performance of the 
combined institution before deciding on the ultimate impact. This is one 
interpretation of Calomiris and Karceski’s view, since they advocate check- 
ing whether cost savings or revenue enhancements can be identified. How- 
ever, they are also willing to entertain the possibility that the market simply 
misunderstands the nature of some transactions-a  point I discuss further 
in the next section. Either way, the authors favor downplaying the market 
reactions. 
An alternative view is  that  once the proposed  merger is announced, 
Firstar forecloses the option to be taken over, thereby extinguishing an 
option and destroying value. Since there  are likely to be  nonnegligible 
transactions costs to unwinding the merger if it is consummated, it may 
be impossible to recover the option. In this case, one could conclude that 
although the merger may lead to a local improvement, from a more com- 
prehensive perspective the merger would not be efficient. 
We  do not have enough information to sort out these competing hy- 
potheses. Absent evidence that the market systematically misprices such 
transactions my preference is to give the benefit of the doubt to the mar- 
ket. Thus, I conclude that it is possible that the Firstar mergers were ill 
advised, even if they did subsequently lead to cost cutting and some reve- 
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Overall, it seems to me that the basic fact that market reactions were 
positive in six of the nine cases is fairly compelling evidence that these 
deals were attractive. We have no reason to believe that this finding is an 
artifact of problems with benchmarking the stock returns. The fact that 
consumer windfalls are omitted from the analysis only strengthens this 
view. Similarly, if one accepts the authors’ view of the two Firstar deals, 
the outlook is even more favorable. Moreover, the other negative stock 
price reaction was associated with the First Chicago-Lake  Shore merger. 
All the supporting evidence corroborates the view that this market reac- 
tion was justified. 
Integrating Case Research and Conventional Research 
This study offers an interesting window into nine specific deals. I sus- 
pect, however, that most banking scholars will wait for more studies before 
drawing any firm conclusions. Nevertheless, in the meantime, I believe that 
there two further contributions that could be made by  further exploring 
the data from these nine cases. 
One path worth pursuing is to flush out new hypotheses that others can 
test. Calomiris and Karceski already develop several interesting hypothe- 
ses from looking at these cases. For instance, they point out that Nations- 
Bank (prior to its subsequent merger with Bank of America) was planning 
to buy back some of its stock because the management believed that the 
market did not fully appreciate their acquisition  strategy. As discussed 
above, it is also plausible to argue that the management at Firstar and 
market participants disagreed over which options to pursue. Obviously, 
one cannot develop hypotheses by scrutinizing a set of data and then test 
the hypotheses on the same data set. However, the possibility that  the 
market systematically misprices certain types of transactions is interesting 
and merits further study. 
I encourage the authors to see if they can pick out some characteristics 
that might predict which types of transactions are most difficult to price. 
For instance, they provide some evidence that there was considerable het- 
erogeneity among the professional analysts that were following Nations- 
Bank. It is well  documented in the accounting literature that analysts’ 
sentiment  is systematically overly optimistic about firms’ earnings per 
share. It would be interesting to know more about whether analyst hetero- 
geneity has any predictive value or whether the typical bias is less pro- 
nounced during periods of high heterogeneity. 
Calomiris and Karceski also stress the idea that relationship financing 
and cross selling are becoming increasingly important to successful banks. 
This view  has  strong support among practioners.  For  instance,  cross- 
selling opportunities are commonly cited by bank analysts that believe the 
Travellers and Citibank merger will be a success. While the authors find 
some support for the existence of synergies, I would like to see if we could Is the Bank Merger Wave of the 1990s Efficient?  177 
use the cases to refine our predictions regarding the success of  synergy- 
motivated mergers. For instance, one could try to develop such predictions 
by systematically contrasting the Harris-Suburban and the First Chicago- 
Lake Shore deals. 
In addition to generating and formalizing new hypotheses, more work 
on critiquing existing methods would be desirable. Many of the basic pa- 
rameters of these deals that are described in table 2-1 are typically unavail- 
able to researchers who are using standard public data sources. It would 
be very useful to see if augmenting the conventional analysis with the type 
of data in that table makes a difference. For instance, one could use a 
standard cost function approach to generate the predicted savings from 
the mergers. After calculating the difference between predicted and real- 
ized savings, one could check whether the unexplained cost variation is 
systematically related to any variables of the sort in table 2-1. 
The basic idea that case studies can help generate new hypotheses and 
refine standard methodology is not controversial. Following through on 
these goals, however, is not easy. It is essential that the data are collected 
and organized in a systematic fashion so that comparisons across studies 
are possible. There is a natural temptation when one gets deep into details 
of particular cases to base explanations on the qualitative information that 
often is available from company insiders and press accounts. Progress will 
depend on aggregating across many studies and such aggregation depends 
on having  tangible information  that  can  be  compared.  Calomiris and 
Karceski have done a good job of avoiding this temptation and collecting 
lots of valuable data. I hope that subsequent researchers who seek to build 
on their work will do the same. 
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